On the true causes of the conflict between Putin and Ulyukaev. Who stands behind and what will follow the arrest of Minister Ulyukaev Who was interfered with by Ulyukaev

If the head of the Ministry of Economic Development has not lost his mind, then the accusations against him look absurd. © Photo from kremlin.ru

The minister was accused of accepting a bribe for setting a relatively low price for Rosneft's purchase of Bashneft. Formally, of course, it is precisely in such transactions that corruption arises. After all, if state property is privatized without a tender or an auction, without rules clearly spelled out in the law, then the price of buying out property depends on the will of individual high-ranking officials. There is something to take, and there is something to give. But in this case, it is extremely difficult to imagine a criminal collusion between the minister and Rosneft, since this company is headed by Igor Sechin, a close friend of President Putin and a man whose influence on key decision-making has been rumored for at least 15 years. Suffice it to say that, according to Mikhail Khodorkovsky, it was Sechin who played the key role in his case. And the main property of Yukos went, as you know, to Rosneft.

That is, in our current story, it turns out that the completely distraught Ulyukaev, who probably has dollars jumping in his eyes, like a cat from the American cartoon about Tom and Jerry, began to blackmail the head of Rosneft personally (and at what other level could the minister negotiate a bribe?) - a person who "opens the door to Putin with his foot." For some reason, the minister did not understand that Sechin, if he needed to resolve a fundamental issue, would do it bypassing the Ministry of Economic Development. And what’s more, I didn’t realize that blackmail at such a level would instantly turn into a criminal case for the blackmailer. If a psychiatric examination shows that Ulyukaev is insane, then this whole story can be believed. If they try to turn him into an ordinary bribe taker, then the “Ulyukaev case” will become absurdly comparable to the case of the Reichstag fire in Germany in 1933 and cases of the same kind that were actively unfolding in our country at the same time.

So far, we have too few facts to understand the essence of what is happening. It is clear that if Ulyukaev is imprisoned, it means that someone needs it. But to whom and for what?

The simplest explanation is purely economic. If the price of "Bashneft" was set for a bribe, then, therefore, the purchase of this company by "Rosneft" can be recognized as illegal. We know for sure that various financial groups fought for Bashneft. We also know that the oligarch Vladimir Yevtushenkov had serious problems, who even had to sit for a while in connection with this. And we can assume (although we don’t know for sure, of course) that the forces competing with Rosneft for Bashneft are influential enough to come into conflict with Igor Sechin himself. In any case, it can be assumed that behind the current story there is a person who also “opens the door with his foot” to Putin’s office. Only not with the right foot, like Sechin, but with the left. And if the president has legal grounds to doubt the legitimacy of the Bashneft deal, then it will be easier for him to act as a “fair judge” than to cover up the crime.

It is difficult, of course, to imagine that Putin would believe this story to be true. But, perhaps, the task of the “Ulyukaev case” is only to create a scandalous situation. The minister will then be released and acquitted, but in the meantime the president will be presented with some additional arguments regarding the need to reconsider the issue of buying Bashneft. And he, in the end, will agree to solve the problem in a new way.

True, if the assumption is confirmed that Rosneft itself initiated this case, then this version will fall apart.

A more complex version of the explanation is economic and political. Ulyukaev, again, will be acquitted and released, but in the meantime someone else will take his post. And this other one will present to the president a different version of industrial policy. Something in the spirit of Sergei Glazyev and Co.: take more money from the budget (or even just “print”) and distribute it to promising Russian businesses. When big money is distributed (even under the pretext of supporting domestic producers, accelerating economic growth and developing import substitution), someone makes good money on it.

It would seem that it is quite easy to push through such an option if it is supported by a truly influential person who has the opportunity to promote his creature to the ministerial post. But Putin is generally known for not putting all his eggs in one basket. Having supported the nobleman who initiated the “Ulyukaev case”, he can, by appointment of a new minister, make a decision at the suggestion of a completely different person. And then the whole combination will collapse. Even if the industrial policy changes radically and the Ministry of Economic Development starts distributing money, financial resources may end up in the hands of completely different persons who started all this. And if so, why bother?

One can imagine not an economic-political, but a political-economic explanation. Our security forces have recently been trying to demonstrate their need for the Kremlin. After all, if you are really needed, then the states are expanded for you and funding is increased. If the president is given the impression that vicious enemies are lurking around, he will cut spending on culture, education, health care and give more money to law enforcement.

It is no coincidence that the FSB often finds all sorts of Islamist terrorists who are cunningly preparing atrocities. It is no coincidence that Bandera's followers are "activated" in the Crimea. It is no coincidence that the United States is constantly plotting against Russia. And "internal enemies" plunder resources. And it doesn't matter who "appoint" these internal enemies. The easiest way - the weakest, unprotected, unpopular, not associated with influential groups. Those for whom people close to Putin will not intercede.

First they took the governor of the Kirov region Nikita Belykh. Putin endured. Thus showed that the liberals can be taken. The security forces raised the stakes: they encroached on the minister. The one whom the patriots do not like because of his long-standing belonging to the liberal camp, and the liberals no longer consider theirs because Ulyukaev is now in the Kremlin camp. No one will cry for Ulyukaev. So why not use his example to demonstrate to Putin the effectiveness of the work of the security forces?

On the one hand, the liberals seem to be getting stronger. Sergei Kiriyenko, long forgotten, has taken a major post in the Kremlin administration. Ella Pamfilova headed the Central Election Commission. Alexei Kudrin ordered an economic program. Finally, the president suddenly remembered, for no reason at all, about the journalist Dmitry Kiselev (who loved to talk about radioactive ash in America) and straightened him up. The people started talking almost about the Thaw.

On the other hand, there is a growing feeling of permissiveness among the security forces and imperial politicians close to the throne. Nobody really answered for the death of Boris Nemtsov. Belykh and Ulyukaev are arrested. They order an economic program to Sergei Glazyev. In a number of regions, the election results are falsified, paying no attention to any Pamfilova. The people are talking about new mass repressions and the need to emigrate.

In such a situation, Putin is not so terrible. Only he becomes the guarantor of security for people who want the normal development of Russia. One gets the impression that without Putin, terrible destructive forces will come to power in our country, ready to falsify, imprison and even kill. The president is turning from a dictator, as he is often called in the West, into a relatively enlightened autocrat. A lesser evil than Kadyrov, Bastrykin or Kiselyov.

Putin is certainly satisfied with this option. With him, he can govern Russia for many more years and even finally get the support of the West. No West wants to do business with President Rogozin and Prime Minister Glazyev.

Dmitry Travin, Professor at the European University at St. Petersburg

Defendant: Alexey Ulyukaev, from June 24, 2013 to November 15, 2016 - Minister economic development Russian Federation.

The main witness / he is the victim: Head of Rosneft Igor Sechin

Third actor : Oleg Feoktistov, in November 2016, the head of the Rosneft security service.

Detention

Ulyukaev was detained on the evening of November 14, 2016 at the Rosneft office on Sofiyskaya Embankment in Moscow. Detention carried out investigative committee with operational support of employees of the Office economic security FSB of Russia. The next day, Ulyukaev was formally charged under Part 6 of Article 290 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (taking a bribe by a person holding a public position in the Russian Federation, with extortion of a bribe and on an especially large scale).

Reaction

November 15, 2016 at night at 3 hours 6 minutes on the official website of MIA "Russia Today" was published a comment by the press secretary Russian President Dmitry Peskov on the detention of the Minister of Economic Development:

“It's night now. I don't know if it was reported to the president. This is a very serious accusation that requires very serious evidence. In any case, only the court can decide anything.”

On the same day, after the court decision, by his decree, President Putin dismissed Ulyukaev from the post of Minister of the Ministry of Economic Development "due to the loss of confidence."

Version of Sechin, Feoktistov and consequences

From the statements of Sechin and Feoktistov to the FSB, it follows that Ulyukaev, during the BRICS summit in Goa in October 2016, extorted a bribe of $ 2 million from Sechin for a positive opinion issued by the Ministry of Economic Development, which granted Rosneft the right to carry out a deal to acquire a state-owned block of shares " Bashneft in the amount of 50%. According to Sechin and Feoktistov, Ulyukaev extorted a bribe with a two-finger gesture (a sign of victory) at the moment when the head of Rosneft was playing billiards with the head of VTB Andrey Kostin. Witnesses interviewed in court (Lifenews correspondent Alexander Yunashev and Rosneft security manager Vadim Derevyagin, who were eyewitnesses to the conversation between Sechin and Ulyukaev in Goa) did not see the two-finger gesture, nor did they hear what the interlocutors were specifically talking about.

Feoktistov, the author of the statement to the FSB, did not see the two-finger gesture, during his closed interrogation in court (details became known to journalists later), he said that after returning from Goa, Sechin came to him to “consult” what to do - Ulyukaev asked him a $2 million bribe. Then Feoktistov advised the head of Rosneft "to show his civic position and help catch a corrupt official."

According to Sechin in his testimony during the investigation (became known to the BBC) and as prosecutors claimed in court, Ulyukaev himself called Sechin on November 14, 2016 and insisted on a meeting at his office, where he was given a briefcase with money. This contradicted the materials of the case, according to which, nevertheless, Sechin called first, and the testimony of Ulyukaev himself.

Prosecutors asked the court to find Ulyukaev guilty, to impose 10 years in prison with a strict regime and a fine of 500 million rubles.

Ulyukaev's position

Doesn't admit guilt. He calls himself a victim of a provocation organized “on the basis of a false denunciation” by Sechin and Feoktistov. During the debate, he demanded that both be held accountable for deliberately false denunciation and operational officers for provoking a bribe. He emphasized: the political weight of the head of Rosneft and his influence are disproportionate to the position. In his speech in the debate, he noted that at the BRICS summit, their conversation with Sechin came down to the fact that they congratulated each other on the deal, and the head of Rosneft promised to treat Ulyukaev with rare wine, which he "never tried." According to the ex-minister, he did not ask for a meeting with Sechin and did not call him himself. On the contrary, Sechin's secretary called Ulyukaev's secretary, but he was absent from the ministry. When he arrived, he called back. Sechin in a telephone conversation persistently invited Ulyukaev to his office, he referred to employment, in particular, to a collegium meeting in the ministry, but in the end agreed to come by 17 o'clock (these words of the defendant were confirmed by wiretapping of conversations voiced in court). According to Ulyukaev, he was sure that the upcoming privatization of 19.5% of Rosneft shares owned by Rosneftegaz would be discussed. During the meeting, Sechin uttered the words "gathered volume"; according to the defendant, he thought that it was about the funds that Rosneft wants to use to buy these shares. On the street near the Rosneft office, Sechin took Ulyukaev to the Christmas tree and, with the words “take it,” pointed to the bag standing on the ground. Ulyukaev took it, being sure that inside was the wine that Sechin had promised him back in Goa.

Trial

In the summer of 2017, the criminal case was transferred to the Zamoskvoretsky court of the capital. The process started on 8 August. Judge Larisa Semyonova repeatedly denied Ulyukaev's defense requests to return the case to the prosecutor's office due to inconsistencies in the indictment.

During the trial, it turned out:

• That the criminal case presented different data on where, when and how exactly Ulyukaev demanded a bribe (in some papers, the place was Goa, in others - Moscow, in others - "in an unidentified place").
• That it was Feoktistov who found $2 million in cash for an investigative experiment. A retired FSB general told the court that he asked for a large sum from “his good friend, a private investor” (he refused to give his name, Ulyukaev’s defense suspects that it was Rosneft’s money) and handed over the money to the security services.
• That it was Feoktistov who sent a letter about extortion from Ulyukaev addressed to the head of the FSB, Alexander Bortnikov. The document contained a postscript signed by Sechin: “In view of the foregoing, we give consent to participate in operational activities.”
• That during the meeting with Ulyukaev there was sound recording equipment in the office of Rosneft on Sechin, and before the meeting he was instructed by the FSB on how to behave and what to say during the meeting with Ulyukaev.

Oddities and scandals

• The only real witness to the conversation between Sechin and Ulyukaev in Goa - the head of VTB Andrei Kostin, who played billiards with the head of Rosneft - was not interrogated either during the investigation or in court for unknown reasons. He himself never commented on this case in the media and, in particular, did not tell if he saw a two-finger gesture from the ex-minister.
• As soon as Ulyukaev's defense asked to be summoned for interrogation in court two FSB officers who participated in the operational experiment against the minister, they were first on a "business trip", and then (when the defense asked to be called again) - on a "long business trip". As a result, they were never seen in court. In particular, "due to business trips" the FSB officer Kalinichenko did not appear in court, who sent a report to the authorities about the discovery of "signs of a crime" in Ulyukaev's actions.
• The main witness Sechin, on whose words the prosecution is based, has never appeared at the trial, despite repeated subpoenas and petitions from Ulyukaev's defense. The reason, as stated by the lawyer of the head of Rosneft, is “business trips” and “increased employment until the end of the year.” The parties did not disclose his testimony, given by him during the investigation. Prosecutors only once (after they had finished presenting their evidence) asked Sechin to be summoned. After his first absence, they did not insist any more.
• Sechin sometimes commented on the course of the proceedings, speaking out about Ulyukayev's guilt even before the verdict. So, in September 2017, when the trial was already underway, Sechin told reporters during the Eastern Economic Forum: “I will testify to you right now. Look: while in the position of minister, Ulyukaev demanded illegal remuneration. He himself determined its size, he himself came for it, he took it with his hands, loaded it into the car and left. According to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, this is a crime.” In the same September 2017, the head of Rosneft called “professional cretinism” the actions of prosecutors who publicly announced in court the transcripts of Ulyukaev and Sechin’s conversations in the Rosneft office, telling how the latter allegedly gave a bribe to the minister. According to Sechin, the transcripts contain "information containing state secrets" that "could not have been made public." True, he did not specify what information he had in mind.
• Separately, the course of the trial was commented on by the press secretary of Rosneft, Mikhail Leontiev. He often emphasized in media comments (also before the verdict) that "the accused was caught red-handed, and exhaustive evidence of his guilt was presented to the court."

Expertise

Among the evidence of Ulyukaev's guilt, the prosecution asked the court to take into account, when passing the verdict, a psychological and linguistic examination of audio recordings of conversations between the ex-minister and Sechin. The recording of the conversation in the Rosneft office was examined by specialists Kislyakov and Ryzhenko from the non-profit Volgograd organization Southern Expert Center, they came to the conclusion that the conversation contained linguistic signs indicating a preliminary agreement between the interlocutors; Ulyukaev, according to experts, demonstrates an understanding of Sechin's statements. In the speech of the latter, as experts in court said, there were no signs of provocation. At the same time, the experts admitted that they did not specifically investigate this issue. According to expert Viktor Kislyakov, Ulyukayev's reactions to Sechin's actions were "natural". According to the expert, he could not "get into the head" of people on the record and draw any conclusions "in reality." However, he saw a "hidden understanding" by the speakers of the topic of conversation.

In addition to the "Southern Expert Center", wiretapping of conversations between Sechin and Ulyukaev in the Rosneft office was studied by expert Ivanov from the FSB Institute of Forensic Science. He had to answer the question about the presence or absence of signs of editing the recording. His findings were not made public in court, but the ex-minister's defense made public the expert's petition to provide him with the original audio files and the recording device itself. The FSB refused to provide Ivanov with the original, on the grounds that the recording “contains state secrets.”

At the request of Ulyukaev's defense, the expert examination of wiretaps was analyzed by the professor of the department forensic examinations MSLA Elena Galyashina, who drew attention to the fact that the recordings were never checked for editing, and the employees of the "South Center" ignored the context of the conversation. Galyashina came to the conclusion that violations were made in this examination, in particular, the analysis of conversations was carried out despite noise interference on the recording. According to the specialist, the experts' conclusions were subjective, arbitrary and not based on linguistic evidence. At the same time, Galyashina noted, judging by the records, it was Sechin who first initiated the meeting with Ulyukayev on November 16, 2016, and then the transfer of the bag. In her opinion, Ulyukaev might not have understood what was in the bag he received from the head of Rosneft.

Outcome

Zamoskvoretsky court of Alexei Ulyukaev to 8 years in a strict regime colony and a fine of 130 million rubles. He will not be able to hold positions in government or state corporations.

Khodorkovsky made the same mistake in his time. © FreeImages.com Content License

Most likely, the people involved in this system will be genuinely offended if they are told that they are corrupt. After all, the polygars believe that they are saving the state by accumulating money in a secret budget. Thanks to the provision of firm power, Russia does without Maidans and revolutions, the people adore the leader, maintain unity and rebuff those who would like to turn a strong Russia into a weak Ukraine.

At the same time, those high-ranking officials who drag money not under the control of polygarhs, but under their own control, are considered real corrupt officials, since they do not strengthen, but weaken the state. They do not act according to the current political system concepts, but in accordance with their own selfish aspirations. Simply put, today it is possible to save Russia, but it is impossible to steal. And you need to understand the difference between these actions, although from a legal point of view they are practically indistinguishable.

And if, taking into account all these important points we take a look today at the "Ulyukaev case", we will find a serious "puncture" former minister, associated not with the extortion of "sausages" from Sechin. Back in the spring of 2016, journalistic investigations showed that a number of high-ranking Russian individuals have money in offshore locations in the West. One of them was managed first by Ulyukaev's son and then by his wife. At the same time, it is known that Ulyukaev was in the civil service. We cannot, of course, know whether Putin's secret activities of his minister came as an unpleasant surprise, but it is reasonable to assume this. It's one thing - offshore, which are used to maintain the regime. Another thing is offshore personal. One thing is officially existing shadow money (strange as it sounds), another is existing unofficially.

These doubly shadow, i.e. hidden from both state and polygarhic control, means are serious threat for system stability. After all, it turns out that under the guise of the highest approved corruption, “necessary to save the state,” there is unapproved corruption used to replenish personal wallets. It is very bad, because, firstly, it undermines our already breathing economy, and secondly, it accumulates funds that, in theory, should have gone to the “common piggy bank”. If Ulyukaev really had a lot of money of unknown origin, if he kept it offshore, and if Putin did not know about such activities of a person from his inner circle, then one can understand the anger of the all-powerful owner. And remembering his reaction to Khodorkovsky's "amateur activity", one can also understand why the punishing sword of justice again fell upon such a large figure.

After the “Khodorkovsky case”, Russian business learned clearly: if a person from the highest echelon of power comes to you and demands money, he must be paid. Otherwise, they will put you in jail. Or take the whole business. It's like in The Three Musketeers, when a "polygar" wanders around the country with a piece of paper issued by Richelieu: "Everything that is done by this person is done with the knowledge of the cardinal and for the good of France." Try to refuse this. And even if he pursues not state interests, but his own, a simple businessman will not understand this - he will still pay.

In general, it can be said that the Putin system is not threatened by any opposition politicians, free media, or even revelations of Alexei Navalny, as long as they are not told to millions of viewers on prime-time TV. And of course, she is not threatened by either sluggish Western sanctions or the mythical Pindos-Bandera, sneaking up to our borders at night. But any officials who undermine the existence of the secret budget and compete with it for the money of the “oligarchs” are absolutely unacceptable to the Kremlin. Without this money, it will be impossible to organize elections in such a way that the same person with the same party always wins them. There is no money to carry out spiritually uplifting and bond-forming political campaigns, after which the people begin to see the “image of the future”, accept Putin as a global leader and angrily reject the unipolar world dominated by the “Washington Regional Committee”.

Khodorkovsky was punished in his time for something other than what he "offended" before Putin. The “thief”, as is known from the old film, must be in prison, even if the purse thrown by Zheglov becomes the formal reason for landing. And Ulyukaev was clearly not punished for the “sausage”. She was simply “thrown up”, getting exactly the result that they wanted. In our courts, it is not difficult to achieve what you want if you belong to the number of polygarches who are allowed to take any necessary actions for the sake of “saving the state”.

All this analysis of the situation with Ulyukaev, of course, is made on the basis of the facts we have. It may need to be revisited at some point. But today other explanations of events look superficial. It is impossible, in particular, to imagine that Ulyukaev is being persecuted as a liberal, since he has long moved away from promoting liberal views and has turned into a completely loyal official. It is hard to believe that he extorted a bribe from the President's closest associate. The assumptions made a year ago that the “Ulyukaev case” would weaken Sechin and the Rosneft company were absolutely not confirmed. But the problems associated with the secret budget of the system are becoming more and more urgent.

Dmitry Travin, professor at the European University in St. Petersburg

The stupid arrest of Ulyukaev derailed our investigation into him. True, we ourselves are to blame - we found it offshore two years ago, but shelved it.

I have no doubt that Ulyukaev is a crook:

1. Here are the documents for his Cyprus offshore, which we found a long time ago. Formally, it belongs to Ulyukaev-dad, but if Alexei Ulyukaev himself is now 60, then his dad is definitely over 80. I strongly doubt that he runs any kind of business and for this he needs a Cypriot company.

The offshore was registered on May 19, 2011, that is, when Ulyukaev was the first deputy chairman of the Central Bank, this is an operating company.

We did not find what was registered on it, but we assume that in this way Ulyukaev hid foreign real estate from declaring.

Now it’s not so interesting to do this - Ulyukaev will cease to be an official - maybe some journalists will dig.

2. Income.

In 2015, he had 60 million and his wife had 15. This is four times more than the salary of the President of the United States. It is clear that this is the same "business" as Volodin, Surkov and all other government officials - just the legalization of corrupt income.

This is such a special investigator (brought from Volgograd), which is used in political cases, when you need to invent everything in general. Fake Specialist.

It all looks like a bad joke, and not a single word of the investigators / operatives can be trusted. Which in no way excludes the first part of my post.

The real reason for the detention, in my opinion, is just a planned nightmare of the elites. Putin's elites are feared and hated. He fears their betrayal, so he does what all authoritarian leaders do in such cases: from Stalin to the leader of the Tumbo Yumbo tribe. Periodically represses some unexpected character, so that the rest are afraid, chat less and more actively knock on each other. Either Geyser, then Belykh, then, here, Ulyukaev.

All power consists of crooks, anyone can be imprisoned. There is an inner circle of crooks, there is a distant one. Ulyukaev from the far, like the rest of the "detained corrupt officials", the risk is higher there. Well, of course, when someone gets a black mark, it is beneficial to someone else. In this case, probably, Sechin. Well, not Sechin, so Figechin, what's the difference: toads and vipers.

Since last night, a politicized audience has been closely following developments that seemed unimaginable just the day before.

The Minister of Economic Development of Russia was detained on charges of extorting a bribe in the amount of 2 million US dollars - with a decision on the issue of choosing a measure of restraint for him in the same Basmanny District Court. Moreover, according to the investigation, the federal minister received illegal remuneration for a positive decision on another “high-profile” story - the acquisition of a 50% state stake in Bashneft by PJSC NK Rosneft. Without exaggeration, the deal of the year was closed on October 12 and cost Rosneft 329 billion 690 million rubles, quarreling with each other several influential political and economic clans at once. Znak.com recalled the chronology of the undeclared and still unfinished war, in which Minister Ulyukayev, most likely, will not be the last “downed pilot”.

War of Igor Ivanovich

The prehistory of the conflict goes back to 2014, when the Moscow Arbitration Court satisfied the claim of the Prosecutor General's Office and declared the privatization of Bashneft OJSC illegal. Then, as a result of a series of transactions, the company first became the property of the ex-head of Bashkortostan Murtaza Rakhimov, and then AFK Sistema, Vladimir Yevtushenkov, departed. Yevtushenkov himself, which is characteristic, at that time was under house arrest, and immediately after the seizure of Bashneft from him, he was released. The case against him was closed for lack of corpus delicti.

In early 2016, it became known about the government's plans to privatize first Bashneft and then Rosneft. After that, it blew up.

First, opposition politician Alexei Navalny published another sensational investigation on his blog. He became aware of the tail number of the aircraft, which is used by the First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Igor Shuvalov. Navalny accused Shuvalov of the fact that the plane, which, according to the blogger, is in his use, was not declared. And as a "peppery detail" he mentioned the wife of the Deputy Prime Minister, who uses the liner to transport Corgi dogs to exhibitions around the world.

Igor Shuvalov then organized a closed meeting for media representatives. Editor-in-Chief of Ekho Moskvy Alexei Venediktov was the only journalist who was allowed to talk about this meeting. Shuvalov assured the audience that the plane mentioned in the investigation of Alexei Navalny rents every time. And that he is not its owner or main user, and if his wife uses a private jet, then honestly, like him, he pays for each flight - like for a taxi called.

As for the apartments in the building on the embankment, Shuvalov, by his own admission, is not going to live there, using real estate as an investment in a blind trust. “Would you prefer that I earn money on state privatization?” - the participants of the meeting retold the arguments of the Deputy Prime Minister.

Against the backdrop of these scandalous stories, a high-ranking government official told Znak.com that the position of Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, his colleague Arkady Dvorkovich, and the hero of today's news, Alexei Ulyukaev, is consolidated. Lukoil, owned by Vagit Alekperov, is considered the preferred buyer of the state-owned stake in Bashneft, while Rosneft will not even be allowed to bid. The leadership of Rosneft, however, thought otherwise.

And it was then that the political establishment, which caught these disagreements, whispered about the beginning of the war of the “Igor Ivanovichs” - Shuvalov and Sechin.

"Answer" was not long in coming. Novaya Gazeta published an investigation according to which the young wife of Igor Sechin spends her time traveling the world on the ultra-luxury yacht "Holy Princess Olga", which does not even match her husband's impressive income. Olga Sechina eventually filed a lawsuit against Novaya Gazeta, accusing the publication of invading privacy and disseminating false information. The court of first instance satisfied her complaint and ordered the newspaper to destroy the circulation, removing the material from its website as well. However, the newspaper appealed this decision, and the Moscow City Court scheduled the continuation of the lawsuit on November 30.

Some time later, the Vedomosti newspaper published an investigation, according to which Igor Sechin is building a house near the Barvikha sanatorium on a plot of 3 hectares with a potential cost of about 60 million US dollars. The reaction of the hero of the publication was the same: the court of first instance ordered Vedomosti to destroy the circulation of the publication. The editors appealed this decision and are ready to fight further.

U-turn over Bashneft

In the meantime, the events around the privatization of Bashneft went on as usual. In August, Bloomberg learned that President Vladimir Putin had made the final decision to refuse the head of Rosneft's request to bid on Bashneft. Ulyukaev made a rationale for the decision, called the participation of Rosneft in the auction "inappropriate". Dvorkovich spoke about the same, and Andrei Belousov, presidential aide, called such an idea “stupidity.”

But soon the situation suddenly changed: Rosneft not only remained among the contenders, but also became the favorite. Moreover, interestingly, Ulyukaev unexpectedly approved her plans for Bashneft. As a result, as already mentioned, the deal was successfully closed.

On the sidelines, it was actively discussed that a single event could fundamentally change the situation: this is a direct conversation between Igor Sechin and Vladimir Putin, during which the head of Rosneft won the head of state to his side.

Ahead is the privatization of Rosneft itself. It is believed that the main contender for itself is Rosneft. So it's time to mention another conflict that is already flaring up around this privatization and in which Sechin and the economic bloc of the government are again involved. On April 11, RBC published the famous article “Sechin asked the government to protect Rosneft from BP.” The article argued that buyers of the 19.5% stake in Rosneft, which is scheduled to be sold in 2016, may be required not to enter into a shareholder agreement with BP, which owns a 19.75% stake in the company. That is, it is told that Sechin actually asked the government to limit the rights of buyers of privatized shares.

The article became famous because, in response, Igor Sechin rolled out claims for a record 3 billion rubles to the publication - for damage to the company's reputation. At the same time, it became clear to many that the leak, which brought the head of Rosneft out of himself, was given precisely in the economic bloc of the government.

Ulyukaev's defense has not yet outlined its position in detail. Lawyer Timofey Gridnev only mentioned that "what happened in the Rosneft office is a provocation against a government official." Moreover, there is no clear explanation of how one of the main opponents of the purchase of Bashneft by Rosneft became its ardent supporter and why the rest of the representatives of the economic bloc in the White House were silent.

And if the issue was really resolved at the level of the first person, then how could the minister dare to extort a bribe?

Moreover, the wording about Ulyukaev's threats to Sechin looks absurd in itself - their apparatus and political weight are too incomparable. In favor of Sechin, of course, Grigory Yavlinsky, who called the extortion story “unbelievable” not by chance, noted that it was the same as if Ulyukaev demanded a bribe from Putin.

Sechin as a super figure

Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev discussed the detention of the Minister of Economic Development of the Russian Federation Alexei Ulyukaev with Vladimir Putin, and also - as a matter of protocol, of course - called for a thorough investigation. In the case of the Minister of Economic Development of the Russian Federation Alexei Ulyukaev, who was detained while receiving a bribe, there are still too many questions, an objective investigation is needed, said Alexei Kudrin, chairman of the board of the Center for Strategic Research. Chubais said he was in shock, Dvorkovich declined to comment...

“Systemic liberals are discouraged, Kudrin literally repeated Medvedev - a common misfortune unites,” Konstantin Kalachev, head of the Political Expert Group, comments on the reaction of the establishment. Interestingly, according to him, Sechin looks in this situation. From a gray eminence, he instantly turned into a simple head of a state corporation, and even a victim of extortion from an all-powerful minister. “That is, Rosneft, it turns out, lives on general rules, and Sechin himself in the business community is only the first among equals, and even his company can find itself in a situation where a bribe is extorted from it,” Kalachev believes.

The leadership of Rosneft deliberately made some image losses, which in the future will turn into image acquisitions.

Political scientist Abbas Gallyamov speaks about the serious success of Igor Sechin. “Now it looks like everyone who opposed the deal for the purchase of Bashneft by Rosneft did it not for ideological reasons, but simply in the hope of earning extra money. All of Sechin's rivals are now under attack. Even if there is no real texture against them, they will be forced to lay low. Just in case," the expert predicts. For the same reason, he believes, the leadership of Bashkortostan will no longer oppose the purchase of the republican stake in Bashneft by Rosneft.

“It is unclear, after all, what evidence and against whom Ulyukaev will give (who has already agreed to cooperate with the investigation - ed.) and what materials the investigation has in general.

Sechin's team is dissatisfied with the way Bashneft was managed under the previous leadership, there are many indications that many assets were withdrawn from the company, and the investigators may well have an invoice on this matter. But there are signatures and subordinates of Rustem Khamitov, ”Gallyamov argues.

In the political establishment, it has recently become fashionable to make historical allusions. They compare the current public apathy and the cumulative negative emotions towards the authorities with the situation in the late 80s. They reflect on the "parade of sovereignties" of the early 90s. The situation with the privatization of Bashneft is still reminiscent of the well-known scandal with the privatization of the state telecommunications company Svyazinvest, which marked the beginning of the largest war of clans around the Kremlin, which quarreled businessman Boris Berezovsky with Anatoly Chubais and other "young reformers". And subsequently, all the participants in the conflict cost dearly: the “young reformers” resigned, and Berezovsky eventually lost his former influence and soon ended up in exile, where, under mysterious circumstances, he died.

In the current situation, a serious blow has been dealt to the government "liberals" and to the government of Dmitry Medvedev as a whole. Igor Sechin, on the other hand, is taking shape as a super-player, a figure comparable in influence only to the president. But it is precisely in this influence that his weak point lies. It will be enough to correctly convey this comparison to the president himself, in which there will certainly be those who wish to participate. The first person in Russia is still one, and it clearly will not tolerate equals next to it.