This interview with Valery Soloviev, a political scientist, doctor of historical sciences, professor at MGIMO, who in recent months has been one of the most (if not the most) accurate predictor of reshuffles in the highest echelons of Russian power, was published on the Internet on September 24 of this year.

There is a lot of food for thought here:

– The idea of ​​early presidential elections has been circulating in the political establishment of Russia since the late spring of this year. The economic and social situation is deteriorating, and they know it is deteriorating. Because of this, it would be counterproductive to hold presidential elections in 2018, when the situation will be much worse and the mood of the masses may turn out to be completely different. As for the fact that it is not Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin who will go to the polls, there are some grounds, I cannot, unfortunately, disclose them, on which he may not go to the polls. There is a serious reason, it is highly plausible, but I do not know how reliable it is, we do not know for sure yet. Already now in Moscow candidates of people who could replace him are being discussed. And some of the names have been spoken, some of them create a feeling of deja vu, nevertheless they are being discussed. There are about half a dozen of them, 6-8 people.

– Can you name them?

- I can name at least one person, besides the one who creates a feeling of deja vu. This is the Tula governor Dyumin. Although I personally think this option is extremely unlikely. But this is if Putin does not go to the polls. If there really are early elections, and Vladimir Vladimirovich goes to them, I think it is very important that Mrs. Yarovaya head the Duma Committee on Constitutional Legislation. Because then the Constitution will have to be corrected, and corrected quickly.

- Why?

- If we are talking about early elections, it is necessary that the powers of the president be terminated ahead of schedule. If the president prematurely terminates his own powers, now, according to the law, he cannot participate in the elections. So the law needs to be changed. Since Mrs. Yarovaya was brilliant at getting frankly insane laws through the Duma, and at the same time enjoys the support of that irresistible force that breaks all obstacles in and around the Duma, her proposed appointment to the post of head of the Duma committee on constitutional legislation will look very eloquently.

- That is, Yarovaya is an argument in favor of the fact that it is Putin who is going to the presidential elections?

- If we are talking about early elections, when do you think they are more likely? In the spring, what did you write about in one of your posts? And when in another post you wrote about a "new window of opportunity" in a year (and this is autumn), did you write about something else?

– If there is an early election, it is wise to do it in the spring, while everyone is in a state of groggy after the “brilliant” results parliamentary elections while the opposition is morally devastated and crushed and society is still ready to move by inertia within the framework of the electoral model that has been imposed on it. And speaking of what might happen in a year, I had in mind other circumstances: a qualitatively new dynamic may appear, but this dynamic can be laid in the spring of 2017.

And further. Judging by what I know, and here my assessments are based not on speculative guesses, but on the opinions of people who are much more knowledgeable than me, the situation in the economy is rather bad. It is worse than we think, and the economy's margin of safety may be exhausted just in time for the fall of next year. This is not a question of the reserve fund running out, these are other problems.

And thirdly, the restructuring of state administration, which is now actually beginning to be carried out, leads not to an increase in efficiency, but to disorganization. This is clearly seen in the story of the Russian Guard and the Ministry of the Interior. There is no de facto guard yet, it exists rather de jure, and the capacity of the Ministry of Internal Affairs has drastically decreased. If the planned personnel changes begin to be carried out at least halfway, we will see the disorganization of the entire apparatus of power from top to bottom. Russia is arranged in such a way that if the bosses change, then all their subordinates begin to change. Therefore, in the fall of 2017, we can see some qualitatively new dynamics, some of its intermediate results.

- A few days ago, official information appeared that more than 14 billion rubles were allocated for the presidential elections in the budget of 2017, and not 2018. The authorities do not hide that it will be in 2017?

- The preparation of the budget began on the eve of the summer, and at the same time rumors began to circulate about early presidential elections, the decision on which should be made following the results of the parliamentary ones. I am not an expert on the budget process, maybe it should be so, that it is necessary to allocate funds in 2017 for the preparation of the 2018 elections. But it is possible that we are talking about the elections in 2017. (The New Times proves that "money is not budgeted in advance - but precisely for the year when it should be spent." - Approx.)

“We need to discuss the nature of your predictions. You have a joking post on Facebook: “Friends from the administration called to congratulate me. They asked me to continue to keep them informed about what is happening in the country. I reluctantly promised.” It seems that you are talking directly about the nature of awareness. Putin's administration has been famous for its absolute secrecy for many years. Now we see information appearing. It may be strange, one-sided, but it appears. Is this change due to the fact that the government has broken up into groups, and they feel free enough to announce their picture of what is happening?

- In my opinion, the internal tension has grown a lot - due to strong external pressure. By external pressure, I mean by no means only relations between Russia and the West, although this is an extremely important factor for the self-awareness and personal strategies of high-ranking representatives of the Russian elite, both political and financial and economic. Those at the top who remain sober of mind are well aware that we are not moving from victory to victory, but from bad to worse. And in a crisis, the struggle for dwindling resources intensifies. When it all comes together - increasing tension, the struggle for resources - then, naturally, information begins to come out. Many people are simply not able to keep silent, they blurt out how bad they feel, how hard and bleak everything is. In addition, information is being used to fight against real and potential opponents, to prevent any personnel changes, to defame certain people. For example, the attack on Igor Shuvalov was caused by the fact that he was considered a likely contender for the post of prime minister. At least he thought he was. And now the highest person of the state is very attentive to high-profile scandals, especially those related to personal indiscretion. The second example is the attacks on Igor Sechin. His very influential opponents (I can say that one of them claims to be prime minister) wanted to curb the appetites of Igor Ivanovich and his corporation. Or, for example, the relatively recent information attacks on the current prime minister, behind which was a high-ranking official. Information begins to go beyond this narrow circle, circulate - and becomes available to everyone. more of people. There is nothing in what I say and write that is not known to all those who are professionally interested in politics in Moscow. But this information must be analyzed and systematized, its reliability must be assessed.

- This information comes from different sides, often it is unverifiable.

- Therefore, I consider it a very good result for me if in 50 percent of cases I turn out to be right. This is almost the accuracy of the weather forecast, at least in Russia. This is a brilliant indicator (laughs)! Perhaps the point is simply that I share my thoughts on Facebook, and someone does not share. I am by no means the only one who can tell you about the future with such accuracy.

- You mentioned the attack on Shuvalov, Navalny wrote about Shuvalov, that is, you accused Navalny of working for ...?

- No, I think in this case everything is more complicated. Alexei Anatolyevich Navalny argues like a politician - he has very serious political ambitions, and not without reason - and reasonably believes that the dissemination of such information, including in his interests. For any opposition - in Russia or in another country - chaos in the elite is beneficial. And it is especially beneficial in those countries where the opposition actually cannot participate in the legal political process, its electoral chances are insignificant or they are not allowed to be realized. So there is nothing surprising in Navalny's information activity.

- Let's talk about the reshuffles that are now being carried out on a large scale. We see a long list of candidates for reshuffles. By the way, you have security forces and other groups opposing them, but it seems that there are many different groups inside the security forces. Do you have a sense of the integrity of what is happening or is it such a war of all against all? Is there a common logic behind the wave of personnel decisions?

- It has a logic, which does not mean that the permutations are made according to some coherent plan. Remember how in War and Peace Tolstoy describes the disposition developed by the Austrian general, and how the troops then act according to their own understanding? The logic is as follows: the highest authorities have a very clear feeling that something needs to be done. What? It cannot compromise with the West - this would mean, from its point of view, serious reputational damage. It does not want to carry out institutional reforms in the economy. And now she is trying, as it seems to her, to update the system of state administration in order to give momentum to all spheres of life. As Karamzin once wrote, Russia does not need a constitution, Russia needs 50 smart and honest governors. This means that we will find smart and honest civil servants, including governors. Where to get footage? It is clear that personnel are drawn from where people who are very trusted. And this, if we talk about the security forces, strengthens not so much the FSB as the Federal Security Service and the Presidential Security Service, which have a rather serious conflict with the Federal Security Service. And the FSB is very afraid that the new head of the service may be a native of a competing department. The same is feared now in the Ministry of the Interior. Moreover, now in all those law enforcement agencies that have their own security services, including the Prosecutor's Office, investigative committee, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, they will be headed and staffed by people from the FSB, which also means tension within the power corporation. Where it leads? Definitely not to increase the efficiency of the apparatus. This already leads to its disorganization, to the fact that established communications are torn. What quality they were is another question, but they were, they worked. These communications are torn, new ones are not built, because it takes time to build them. Nervousness grows, everyone looks at each other with distrust, and even with hatred. So the general logic is the logic of the preservation and survival of power and in power, nothing more. This is not the logic of what we might call modernization, economic and political reforms.

- If you look at your list of predictions: Medvedev "for a promotion", a security official for prime minister, Kudrin "deleted", Volodin for the Duma, Naryshkin for the SVR and so on - can we say that the logic of these appointments is based on what in 2017 Putin will be replaced by Medvedev?

- (Laughs.) And this is also possible. Remember how it was in 2007 - before handing over the presidential household to a replacement, Vladimir Vladimirovich placed in key positions - deputy ministers and the like - people from the corporation to which he professionally belonged. So that's how it can be described. You see, we are not even dealing with facts yet, we are discussing mostly assumptions. From these assumptions, we can build any concept, the most sophisticated conspiracy theories, but there is no guarantee that it will turn out to be true. This can be perceived both as the creation of a safety net in case a new presidential candidate appears from the authorities, and simply as an increase in the efficiency of the apparatus, an increase in loyalty, an attempt to dynamize the apparatus, what young people call "movement" Here some kind of "movement" will appear, and lazy fat cats will start catching mice.

- The current elections, you write, have shown that the opposition has failed and cannot come to power by legal means, but it has "other ways". In addition, surprisingly, after these elections, we see in the public field dissatisfied statements by pro-Putin people, they are dissatisfied with the way the elections were held. There is a feeling that at all levels there are those who are dissatisfied with the elections. Does this create a revolutionary situation?

- This does not create a revolutionary situation, it simply expresses the growing misunderstanding, irritation and confusion in all sectors of society, from top to bottom. Nobody understands where we are going. Russia is now very reminiscent of a ship without a rudder and sails. What are our goals, what is the strategy, what are we achieving - it is not clear. The vast majority of people have a steady feeling of deterioration, which is already very serious, and which is for a long time, they do not see the prospect. It is enough to read the official forecasts of government departments, and it becomes clear: they expect the crisis, recession to last at least another three or four years. And people in horror think: how are we going to live? Our real incomes are declining every year! This has not yet resulted in any radical political and social behavior. Well, we see separate flashes - an attempt by tractor drivers to march on Moscow.

- Farmers meet with Putin.

- And it's very right move in terms of power. This should have been done earlier, not to disperse, not to hinder them, but to provide them with a meeting, if not with Putin, then with someone else, in order to calm them down. Another thing is that these specific ones can be calmed down, but there is no money in the country to flood all such problems with them all the time. Therefore, discontent will grow. It is now very similar to smoldering peat: everything seems to be fine, everything has adapted, but this is not so. It's not what it seems. There is a not very visible, but a serious change in the public consciousness. And sociologists know this, fix these changes. They predict that the changes will be of a qualitative nature. But no one can answer the question of when these changes will result in new social behavior and what kind of social behavior this will be. The only forecasts with terms coming from sociologists that I saw indicated that in 2017 there would be a turning point in the mass consciousness. But it does not follow from this that this will be a turning point in political and social behavior. We discussed that there are tensions and conflicts in the elite, but these conflicts can become a split only if the elite feels massive pressure from below. As soon as we see that riots and social protests are taking over several regions of Russia - simultaneously or sequentially, it does not matter - we will immediately notice that the elite has some kind of independent political position, different from the position of the supreme power. This is the normal logic of all political changes in the world, if you do not take such extreme forms as a military mutiny and coup d'état, which in Russia will not come to. In our country, changes will take place according to the classical scenario, if they take place.

- And what is this classic scenario?

– The classic scenario is very simple. Unexpectedly for everyone - and this always happens unexpectedly - the social degree in society rises, protests begin - most likely, first in the provinces, in industrial regions, because in Moscow everything is cemented, the opposition is frankly afraid, and it has reasons afraid. Unrest begins, and the people who will take to the streets - workers, tractor drivers, drivers, combine operators - cannot be accused of being a "fifth column", acting on the money of the State Department. After that - political speeches in large cities, primarily in the capitals, in Moscow and St. Petersburg. At the same time, the elite are hesitating, which is beginning to think about how to lend a hand to the people. And then it turns out that some groups of the elite have always been with the people, have always been democrats, have always wanted change and fought to not get worse. Here is the classic scenario.

– When you talked about the scenario that not Putin, but Medvedev is going to the polls, you didn’t mean that the highest authorities in Russia understand the situation exactly as you describe it, and are preparing to somehow prevent this? Did you mean that these are some personal decisions of Vladimir Putin?

– Yes, it has a slightly different motivation. But the factor I'm talking about is always taken into account. The authorities are very interested in the mood of the masses, they are afraid of mass protests, they learned from the experience of late 2011 - early 2012, when these protests began unexpectedly for everyone, like a devil from a snuffbox. And there is another important circumstance: in order to keep the economy afloat in Russia, let alone to ensure at least some minimal development, it is critically important to remove the sanctions regime or at least seriously weaken it. But the government that is in Russia now cannot negotiate this with the West, which is well known to everyone in Russia and in the West. Accordingly, we need another government, formally another, which could take the initiative to defuse tensions in Russian-American relations, which now, judging by the events in Syria, are moving towards a very dangerous line. Someone has to unblock the situation, or we will move on a path of further escalation, if not military, then verbal, political and strategic, and this will simply undermine our economy. Russia is not strong enough to allow itself to compete with the West in the economic and military-strategic spheres.

– Tell us about your new book and about the revolution. How does your book relate to the situation in Russia?

- My book is called "Revolution! Fundamentals of revolutionary struggle in modern era"and the genre is historical and sociological in nature, not historical. I write about revolutions in general. But I am primarily interested in the experience of the so-called" color "revolutions that have taken place over the past ten years, and I am especially interested in the post-Soviet space "I also interpret the Russian experience of 2011-12 as an attempt at a revolution that the authorities successfully stopped, in contrast to the revolutions in Ukraine and some other post-Soviet and not only post-Soviet countries. I raise the question of whether it is possible to predict a revolution at all. Based on this what I know and what everyone who has studied revolutions writes, not a single revolution was predicted anywhere and by anyone, all revolutions always started unexpectedly.I analyze, like any person who is interested in Russian politics and history, the risk factors that exist now in Russia.I think that we do not fully understand what the main risk factor is.

– In what?

– It consists in the fact that in 2014 Russia itself began a new dynamic. Everything connected with Ukraine, with Crimea, was the beginning of a new dynamic. By the end of 2013, the situation in Russia was absolutely cemented. However, quite often crises begin not due to external and internal pressure, but due to the actions of the authorities themselves. Power, which has no challenges, loses its sense of self-preservation. What started in 2014 was in the realm of geopolitics, but the system is designed in such a way that if you start dynamizing one part of it, you inevitably turn on the dynamics for other parts of the system. And this is also a classic of the changes that have taken place in the world. Soviet Union collapsed not because the West won, it collapsed because of the dynamics that were initiated in the Soviet Union itself. If you look world history, then we will see that reforms or military expansion began in certain countries in order to strengthen the regime, give it a new breath, and everything ended with the collapse of the regime. But we will only see that when and if it starts to unfold. Moreover, the beginning of political changes can occur so quickly that we, say, went to bed in one country, and wake up in a completely different one.

- We were taught that there is a certain driving force of the revolution: the working class, or not the working class, but there must be some class. Who could it be? These tractor drivers, miners? Who are these people?

- The peculiarity of modern revolutions is that they do not have a hegemonic class, there is not even a political hegemon. Situational protest coalitions arise in them, and thanks to social networks, the Internet - which is why the authorities are so afraid of social networks and the Internet - these coalitions are emerging rapidly. If you look at the Egyptian "lotus" revolution, you will see that in Tahrir Square, westernized students demanding democratization and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood stood side by side. Or what we saw on the Kiev Maidan. Situational protest coalitions arise very quickly, because these political and ideological clusters have already established, if not cooperation, then communication on the Internet and in social networks. Studies of the Russian social blogosphere have shown a very interesting thing: we have political and ideological clusters that seem to be opposites - nationalists, liberals, leftists - unlike other countries, they communicate and cooperate intensively. They don't close in their own ghettos. That is, the cultural and communication basis for such a protest coalition already exists. It is just necessary that several circumstances come together, and we will see this coalition, it will arise very quickly. Moreover, a coalition of this kind always acts under the slogan "We want justice." Members of the coalition put their own content into this concept, but they have one slogan: "Justice!" And their second slogan: "Power is unfair, so it must be overthrown or changed." That is the whole ideology of the revolution. This has been the case for the last 15-20 years. No batch of new or latest type, no advanced class is simply needed.

There is an important amendment here. In 2014, after Crimea, Russian nationalists crossed into another trench, and the parapets of the trenches are so high that it is hard to imagine that they will again unite with the liberals in the fight against the regime of Vladimir Putin. Do you insist that the new coalition can include nationalists, liberals and democrats?

– And leftists, and environmentalists, and animal rights activists... The issue of Crimea, the issue of Ukraine is now a third-priority issue for the Russian political discourse. They are not on the top agenda of Russian society. You can turn Crimea into an insurmountable obstacle, or you can take it out of the bracket by saying: we have more important problems, and when we solve the important problems, we will deal with everything else. What PARNAS did, including the nationalist Maltsev, just indicates that such a coalition can work. Did the issue of Crimea stand in the parliamentary campaign? No. Was there a question about the attitude towards the war in Ukraine, towards the Donbass? Nothing like this. Society doesn't care anymore. He has other problems, and these problems are described in one word - justice. Russian society is in dire need of justice. It is not enough, for example, for those who are engaged in business, they believe that they are unfairly offended, they are under strong administrative, fiscal and non-legal pressure. Any group can say about itself that it is unfairly offended. Crimea and Ukraine do not and will not in the future have any significance for the Russian political agenda.

- For a successful revolution, in addition to speaking from below, there must be a part of the elite ready to go over to the side of the speakers. Here you say that Kudrin "crossed out", but the liberals still have the economic bloc of the government. That is, the notorious "systemic liberals" do not have political weight, but, perhaps, they are betting on Medvedev's promotion - these are all such idle arguments. It cannot be that all these leaks that have appeared that we are talking about are just an attempt by some part of the elite to let it know somewhere outside that, in principle, there is someone in the elite who is ready at some point support something?

No, that would be too strategically difficult for them. They think exclusively in group categories, although they may have some kind of implicit ideology. But this implicit ideology - systemic liberals, security forces - will become apparent in a situation of increasing social suppression. The elite splits when they see pressure from below and make a rational choice operation: why should I sink with the regime when I can lend a hand to the rebellious people (let's call it that)? And then there will be a competition for who will be the first to lend a hand! Which group of the elite will be successful is difficult to say, it depends on the circumstances. But I can say that no one will particularly resist. One should not exaggerate the ability of the ruling elite of Russia and the regime in general to resist. He tries to come across as very tough, brutal, ready for anything, and succeeds. However, our power is not a granite rock, not a monolith, it is porous Swiss cheese. She just hasn't faced any serious pressure from below, she hasn't even faced not very serious pressure from below yet. As soon as it collides, we will see how the cheese starts to crumble.

- At one time you described yourself as a "nationalist in the best sense of the word", a liberal and a democrat. There are people in power who communicate with you, and it can be assumed that people usually communicate with those who are close to them in some sense. If we imagine that some part of the elite will support protests from below, who will it be - nationalists in the best sense, liberals, democrats, or someone else?

– I think that, most likely, it will be technocrats. In Russia, there is a considerable technocratic layer in power. It is not very noticeable, because these people do not shine, they prefer not to be public, but they are very influential. As a rule, these are people in the rank of deputy ministers. And some ministers too. These are people who understand that the problems facing the country must be solved based not on ideologies, but on common sense and economic logic. In Russia it is necessary to provide economic development, it is necessary to restore social subsystems. This is not about reforming health care and education, but about restoring their normal activities. We need to restore the effectiveness of the administrative apparatus. And we need to create a working legal system. These are large-scale, but technocratic tasks, they do not imply any ideological background. We do not say that we want to change the form of ownership, that we want to return revolutionary expediency and proletarian legality to the place of the formally functioning judicial system. In Russia there are some shells of institutions, they need to be filled with a working content. Even in the case of the most massive changes, it is not a social revolution. What happened in 1917 will not happen. There will be no large-scale redistribution of property, no civil war. The energy potential in society is too low for it to go to some kind of war. We will have to solve the problems of survival and development, acting outside of ideological paradigms. As for the ideology of the protest, any appeal to society by the protest coalition will be populist. There is no need to be afraid of this, this is the norm in all countries where such changes have begun.

- And this hypothetical person - a successor who will be formulated within the authorities, or a person brought by this pressure group from below - the elite of technocrats should accept him, and he will be their ideological cover?

- We are talking on the day of Dzhabrailov's arrest...

Arrest already? No detention?

- So far, the detention, but the charge has been brought: hooliganism. Shot in a hotel. Four seasons. At Red Square.

Well, that's okay. I think they will let go. The maximum is a subscription. (While he was writing, he was released on a subscription. Either someone knocks on him, or he writes the script himself. - D. B.)

- But before he was generally untouchable ...

Yes, there will be no inviolable now, except for the narrowest circle. The problem is not that there are no institutions in Russia, but that a typical Russian institution - the roof - stops working. A month ago, they hinted to me that two banks were under attack - Otkritie and another one, which is considered ethnic, and that there would not be enough funds to save both. The Opening has just been rescued. So the rest of the can get ready? And there is such a roof!

- What about Kadyrov? They don't want to change it?

It has been wanted to be replaced for a long time.

- After the assassination of Nemtsov?

After the assassination of Nemtsov, he even left Russia for a while. But the idea was even earlier, even, they say, they found a replacement - but that person had not been to Chechnya for a long time and did not come up. However, for Kadyrov it would be an honorable dismissal: it was about the status of Deputy Prime Minister. But no portfolio.

- Did Chechnya know about this supposed change?

Yes. And Kadyrov, of course, knew. After all, his famous phrase that he is "Putin's infantryman" means a readiness to obey any order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Has Putin already made a firm decision to go to the polls?

Judging by the fact that the election campaign is in full swing, yes. Actually, everything became clear when meetings with young people began: the Kremlin realized that they were missing them. However, the president meets with young people not only out of duty: he seems to like to communicate with them.

- And them?

Im not sure.

- Why, I wonder: Schubert, syphilis ...

Schubert had syphilis. And there were problems with women. But still, young people are more interested in something else, and Putin does not speak their language exactly. His PR does not look brilliant at all yet: a photo shoot with a naked torso is not the most successful replica of a ten-year-old photoset.

- Do you think this is the deadline - or will it stay forever?

I think that this is not even a deadline, but a transit. He gets elected and leaves Yeltsin's scenario in two or three years.

When Khodorkovsky gave such a forecast four years ago - just to Sobesednik - everyone laughed, but today it is almost a commonplace ...

Well, it's definitely not funny anymore. There are signs that the situation is getting out of control. How exactly it will turn out, how traumatic it will be, is still unclear: in such historical bindings there is always a colossal number of unknown variables, and they are added. There is a smooth scenario - something like a replay of December 31, 1999. There is a non-smooth but peaceful one - involving the street, but without violence. As the events of 1991 and 1993 show, the army is extremely reluctant to shoot at compatriots. Well, if, God forbid, blood is shed, then the experience of the Kyiv Maidan shows that even a peaceful revolution after the first people killed drastically changes its character. About 120 people were killed in Kyiv, and after that, the Yanukovych regime was doomed, no matter what conditions and compromises it then made. If everything goes smoothly, Putin will simply hand over power to a successor.

- Shoigu?

Hardly. There is no complete, unconditional trust in Shoigu. It seems that the President and the Minister of Defense are very close, but the impression is that along with attraction there is some kind of psychological repulsion. Perhaps because Putin and Shoigu are similar in something very important: a certain messianism is inherent in both. At the same time, Shoigu is almost the most popular minister of Russia, which is a considerable merit of his brilliant, since the time of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, PR service. True, I will never and never believe that, despite his messianism, the Minister of Defense is capable of some kind of daring independent action.

- Rogozin?

Of course not. He probably really wanted it.

- Then who?

The security forces - both the army and the special services - are discussing Dyumin's candidacy as a foregone conclusion.

- And what is Dyumin-president?

I highly doubt his ability to hold on and keep the situation. You see, Putin's system is a system sharpened personally (I emphasize: personally!) for Putin. It's a pyramid on top, shaky but holding on. If the top is removed, the pyramid will fall, but how it falls is already unpredictable.

- And then the territorial collapse?

Lord, what kind of territorial disintegration? Why all of a sudden, where? The country is held by three, sorry for the expression, braces, each of which would be quite enough. Russian language. Russian ruble. Russian culture. The main thing is that no one is rushing out of the Russian Federation, even in Tatarstan centrifugal forces are insignificant - they can ask for some symbolic preferences at most ... Even the North Caucasus, the most dangerous region in this sense, does not understand who to stick to outside of Russia and how to live.

- And who can come to power if a successor does not hold out? Fascists?

Firstly, I would not even call them “fascists”, because they have no real ideology, no program, no organization. They are capable of giving interviews, but they are not able to build a working organization. In addition, they are now driven underground and rather demoralized. Secondly, if they are allowed to be elected to parliament, they will receive five to seven percent (this is even in the best scenario for them). And I am in favor of introducing them to the parliament - it is very civilizing and reduces the level of danger. There can be no fascism now, because everyone is too lazy. Remember real fascism: Italy, Germany - a colossal strain of forces. And now, in general, no one wants to strain, there are no ideas, and such things are not done without an idea. And those whom you call "fascists" have the whole entourage from the last century, they did not provide any qualitative novelty.

- Do you also rule out mass repressions?

What about the meaning?

- Pure pleasure.

Even the generals of the FSB will not get real pleasure from this, whether it's a personal yacht. And even more so their children. I understand why you are asking about repressions, but the Serebrennikov case is just an attempt by the security forces to show who is the boss here. So unobtrusively. And then some have already thought that they can influence the first person. No one can, and then - the first person in eternity, in History. And here and now the security forces are in control. How did they chant at opposition rallies in 2012? "We are the power here!"

- And it seemed to me that this was a dig under Surkov.

Nothing threatens Surkov. He is just inviolable, because he conducts all the difficult negotiations on Ukraine, on the Donbass.

- By the way, about Ukraine. What, in your opinion, is the fate of Don-bass?

The longer he stays outside Ukraine, the more difficult it will be to integrate him there, and the time limit, as it seems to me, is five years. After that, alienation and enmity can become difficult to overcome. As the Russian side says at the talks: if we weaken support for the Donbass, Ukrainian troops will enter there and mass repressions will begin. However, there is a certain compromise option: Donbass goes under interim international administration (UN, for example) and the “blue helmets” enter there. Several years (at least five - seven) will be spent on the reconstruction of the region, the formation of local authorities, and so on. Then a referendum is held on its status. Currently, Ukraine is vehemently rejecting the idea of ​​federalization because Russia is proposing it. And if Europe proposes federalization, then Ukraine can accept this idea.

- And no Zakharchenko?

He will go somewhere... If not to Argentina, then to Rostov.

- What do you think: in the summer of 2014, it was possible to go to Mariupol, Kharkov, then everywhere else?

In April 2014, this could have been done much easier, and no one could have defended themselves. One local high-ranking character, we will not name names (although we know), called Turchynov and said: if you resist, in two hours the troops will land on the roof of the Verkhovna Rada. He wouldn't have landed, of course, but it sounded so convincing! Turchynov tried to organize a defense, but only the police with pistols were at his disposal. And he himself was ready to climb onto the roof with a grenade launcher and in a helmet ...

- Why didn't you go? Afraid that SWIFT will be turned off?

I don't think it would be turned off. In my opinion, they would have swallowed it the same way they swallowed Crimea in the end: after all, we have the main sanctions for the Donbass. But, firstly, it turned out that in Kharkov and Dnepropetrovsk the mood is far from being the same as in Donetsk. And secondly, let's even say you have annexed Ukraine as a whole - and what to do? There are only two and a half million people in Crimea - and even then its integration into Russia is, frankly, not going smoothly. And here - about forty-five million! And what will you do with them when it is not clear how to deal with your own?

- Actually, there is another scenario. Kim Jong-un will bang - and all our problems will cease to exist.

Doesn't bang.

- But why? Did he launch a rocket over Japan?

He has few of these missiles. And he won't do anything with Guam. The only thing he really threatens is Seoul. But South Korea has the status of a strategic ally of the United States, and after the first strike on Seoul - and there really is nothing to be done there, the distance is 30-40 km to the border - Trump has a free hand and the Kim regime ceases to exist.

“So it’s all going to end there?”

I think under Trump, yes. My friends from Seoul...

- Sources too?

Colleagues. And they say that there is no premonition of war or even a military threat: the metropolis lives an ordinary life, people do not panic ...

- What, in your opinion, is Russia's real role in Trump's victory?

Russia (or, as Putin called it, "patriotic hackers") did launch attacks, after which Obama said he warned Putin and the attacks stopped. But all this was before September 2016! Otherwise, Trump's victory is the result of his successful political strategy and Hillary's mistakes. She couldn't play on the predestination factor. If you talk all the time about your uncontested victory, they will want to teach you a lesson. This, by the way, is one of the reasons why Putin is slow to announce the campaign. What did Trump do? His team clearly understood which states to win. Trump has successfully politicized the rednecks, a white middle class that is embittered and somewhat stagnant. He showed them an alternative: you are not voting for an establishment man, but for a simple guy, the flesh of the flesh of authentic America. And he won on it. But Trump - and this was understood here - is not so good for Russia: rather, Moscow simply did not like Clinton very much.

- Is there a global revenge of conservatives in the world?

It was possible to believe in these myths in 1916, when Brexit happened at the same time, Trump won, and Le Pen got some chances. But Le Pen never had a chance to go beyond the second round. And then ... Relapses happen, without them the era does not go away, but as the era of Gutenberg ended, so did the time of political conservatism, as we knew it before. People live with other oppositions, other desires, and the fight against globalism is the destiny of those who want to live in the "mental Donbass". There will always be such people, these are their personal ideas, which do not affect anything.

- A big war is not visible on the Russian routes?

We certainly do not initiate it. If others start, which is extremely unlikely, they will have to participate, but Russia itself has neither the idea, nor the resource, nor the desire. What war, what are you talking about? Look around: how many volunteers went to Donbass? War is a great way to solve internal problems, as long as it does not lead to suicide: this is the situation now.

- But why did they take Crimea then? Distracted from the protests?

I don't think. The protests were not dangerous. Putin just wondered: what will remain of him in history? Olympics? And if he really raised Russia from its knees, what was the result of this? The idea of ​​appropriation/return of Crimea existed before the Maidan, just in a milder version. Let's buy it from you. It was possible to agree on this with Yanukovych, but then the power in Ukraine collapsed, and Crimea actually fell into hands.

- And will remain Russian?

I guess yes. It will be written in the Ukrainian Constitution that he is Ukrainian, but everyone will put up with it.

- But how do you imagine the idea that post-Putin Russia will live with?

Very simple: recovery. Because now the country and society are seriously ill, and we all feel it. The problem is not even corruption, this is a special case. The problem is in the deepest, triumphant, general immorality. In absolute absurdity, idiocy, which is felt at all levels. In the Middle Ages, where we fall - not by someone's evil will, but simply because if there is no movement forward, then the world is rolling back. We need a return to the norm: normal education, calm business, objective information. Everyone wants this, and, with a few exceptions, even those around Putin. And everyone will breathe a sigh of relief when the norm returns. When they stop inciting hatred, and fear will cease to be the main emotion. And then money will quickly return to the country - including Russian money, withdrawn and hidden. And we will become one of the best launch pads for business, and economic growth within ten to twenty years may turn out to be record-breaking.

- And how will we all live together again - so to speak, our Crimean and Namkrysh?

So how did you live after the Civil War? You have no idea how quickly it all grows. People sort things out when they have nothing to do, and then everyone will have something to do, because today there is total senselessness and aimlessness in the country. This will end - and everyone will find something to do. Except, of course, those who want to remain irreconcilable. There are five percent of such people in any society, and this is their personal choice.

- Finally, explain: how are you tolerated at MGIMO?

You know from your own experience that there are different people at MGIMO. There are retrogrades and liberals, there are rightists and leftists. And I am neither the one nor the other. I look at everything from the standpoint of ordinary, unbiased common sense. And to everyone who wants to be a successful interpreter of reality here, I can give the only advice: do not look for cunning plans and malicious intent where banal stupidity, greed and cowardice operate.

Valery Solovey: by 2024 Russia will have 15-20 regions and state ideology

Political scientist, MGIMO professor Valery Solovey expressed his opinion on the rumors about the imminent constitutional reform in Russia.

The other day, the chairman of the constitutional court, Valery Zorkin, spoke about the need to change the Constitution of the country.

According to Professor Soloviy, by 2024 the number of subjects of the federation will be reduced in Russia through unification and state ideology will be introduced.

Valery Solovey:

I have already had to write and speak on this topic, and I will repeat with pleasure.

1. The preparation of a constitutional reform, or rather fundamental changes in a wide range of constitutional laws, was launched in the fall of 2017.

2. Changes were developed in the following areas:

a) formation of a new configuration of state power and administration;

b) a radical reduction in the number of subjects of the federation (up to 15-20) by combining them in order to facilitate management, equalize levels of development and neutralize ethno-separatist tendencies;

c) resolute amendment of the laws on elections and political parties (by no means in the sense of liberalization);

d) the introduction of state ideology.
Well, and one more thing.

3. Initially, it was not clear which of the changes and to what extent would be given a green light, and which would not.

But in any case, they were not supposed to be implemented all at the same time due to the predicted strong negative reaction.

4. Sine qua non - reconfiguration of state power and administration, which should provide an institutional and legal framework for the transit of the system.

There are several options here too.

From the well-known model with the establishment of the State Council as an analogue of the Politburo and the reduction of the role of the president to representative and symbolic functions, to, on the contrary, the strengthening and expansion of presidential powers and the establishment of the post of vice president. (There are several more options.)

5. The transit of the system must be carried out before 2024 in order to surprise the enemies of external and internal. It was assumed that 2020-2021 could be decisive.

6. There is only one reason why these dates could be moved down.

And this reason has nothing to do with politics and declining ratings. The situation is assessed as worrying but not critical and under control.

7. And even more so, there was no talk of any early elections and could not be. A cardinal change in the organization of state power and administration is not carried out in order to hold elections and subject the system to extreme stress.

8. Among the key beneficiaries of the reform, the authorities name three people who are already in the top ten of the elite in terms of their political and bureaucratic weight.

There is a bright palette in the assessments of the figure of political scientist Valery Soloviev - he is both a spy, and a Russian nationalist, and a specialist in suggestion. The incredible accuracy of his forecasts of certain events in the life of the country voluntarily or involuntarily conjures up the idea that the professor has his own network of informants in the vertical of power. The general public recognized Valery Soloviev after high-profile performances on Manezhnaya Square in December 2010 and on the RBC TV channel.

Childhood and youth

The details of the life of a political scientist available in the sources are not rich in facts. Valery Dmitrievich Solovey was born on August 19, 1960 in the Lugansk region of Ukraine, in a city with a promising name - Happiness. There is no information about Nightingale's childhood.

After high school, Valery became a student at the Faculty of History of the Moscow state university. After graduating from the university in 1983, he worked for ten years at the Institute of History of the USSR of the Academy of Sciences. In 1987 he successfully defended his dissertation for the degree of candidate of historical sciences.

Further work biography of Valery Soloviev continued in the international fund for socio-economic and political research "Gorbachev Fund". According to some reports, Nightingale worked in the fund until 2008. During this time, he prepared several reports for international organizations, including the UN, was a visiting researcher at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and defended his doctoral dissertation.

By the way, some observers and political scientists reproach Valery with connections with the foundation and the London School of Economics, believing that both of these institutions a priori cannot be carriers of the ideas of creating a strong Russian state. Simultaneously with his work in these organizations, Valery Solovey held a position in the editorial board and wrote articles in the journal Free Thought.

Since 2009, the political scientist has been a member of the Expert Council of the international analytical journal Geopolitika. The magazine promotes the ideas of preserving Russian identity, statehood, spreading the Russian language and culture. Well-known media personalities work in the editorial office - Oleg Poptsov, Anatoly Gromyko, Julietto Chiesa. In addition, Valery Solovey is the head of the Department of Advertising and Public Relations at MGIMO University.

Science and social activities

In 2012, Professor Nightingale made an attempt to make himself louder in the political arena, creating and leading the New Force party, which he announced in January of the same year on the air of the Ekho Moskvy radio station. Nationalism, according to the professor, underlies the worldview of normal people, because only thanks to such an attitude to life will there be a chance to keep the country.

Despite the fact that the ideas propagated by the party found understanding among the people, the registration in the Ministry of Justice "New Force" did not pass. The official website of the party is blocked, the pages on Twitter and VKontakte are abandoned. This is not surprising, given the right-liberal position of Valery Soloviev: he does not see nationalism as a threat to society, does not consider it an ideology.

Nevertheless, Valery Solovey continues to be active. To date, he is the author and co-author of 7 books and more than 70 scientific articles, and the number of Internet publications and articles in the media is in the thousands. It has long become a tradition in the journalistic environment to interview one of the country's most famous political scientists on every little bit significant occasion.

Candid, unvarnished notes by Nightingale in his own blog on the Echo of Moscow website, on personal pages in Facebook and "In contact with" collect a lot of comments. Quotes from speeches, professor's forecasts (by the way, surprisingly accurate) become the subject of discussions, they are taken as a basis in the expression on the pages of LiveJournal of the personal position of caring citizens.

Personal life

All that is known about personal life Valery Nightingale, this is that the professor is married and has a son, Pavel. My wife's name is Svetlana Anashchenkova, originally from St. Petersburg, graduated from the psychology department of St. Petersburg State University, is engaged in the publication of children's literature, teaching aids.

In 2009, together with his sister Tatyana, also a doctor of historical sciences, Nightingale published the book “The Failed Revolution. The Historical Meanings of Russian Nationalism”, which the authors dedicated to their children, Pavel and Fyodor.

Valery Solovey now

The last book so far by Valery Solovyov is “Revolution! Fundamentals of Revolutionary Struggle in the Modern Era” was published in 2016.

In the fall of 2017, it became known that the leader of the Party of Growth, a billionaire and the commissioner for the protection of the rights of entrepreneurs, would participate in the presidential elections in Russia in 2018. In the campaign headquarters of the party, Valery Solovey was appointed responsible for ideology. The professor believes that from the point of view of propaganda, the campaign has already been won, and the goal of Titov's nomination is to influence economic strategy.

Among the last "prophecies" of Nightingale are the imminent maturation of the political crisis, the loss of control by society, and the aggravation of the crisis in the economy. In addition, on the Facebook page, Valery Dmitrievich expressed the opinion that supposedly one should expect the appearance of Russian volunteers in military conflicts on the territory of Yemen, as happened with Libya and Sudan. In other words, Russia will be drawn into another conflict, which will again entail multibillion-dollar expenses and rejection of the country in the international arena.

Nightingale predicts Putin's next presidency will end soon, in two or three years, and the reason is not even in the years of Vladimir Vladimirovich (the heads of state are much older), but in the fact that "the people of Russia are tired of Putin." And then a series of serious changes will follow.

Speaking about a possible successor, Nightingale does not consider the Minister of Defense as such, whose candidacy is not directly, but is discussed in narrow circles. The political scientist drew attention to the former deputy Shoigu, lieutenant general, governor of the Tula region.

On the exaggerated Ukrainian issue and the topic of the US presidential election, Valery Solovey is also straightforward. According to the political scientist, relations with Ukraine will no longer be the same, and Crimea will remain Russian. And Russia, albeit long before the elections, launched attacks, but the victory was due to a successful political strategy, exploitation of the role of a guy from a neighboring yard and mistakes.

Publications

• 2007 - "Meaning, logic and form of Russian revolutions"
• 2008 - "Blood and soil of Russian history"
• 2009 - “The Failed Revolution. Historical Meanings of Russian Nationalism"
• 2015 – “Absolute weapon. Fundamentals of psychological warfare and media manipulation.
• 2016 - Revolution! Fundamentals of the revolutionary struggle in the modern era"

https://www.site/2016-03-25/politolog_valeriy_solovey_my_pered_ochen_sereznymi_politicheskimi_peremenami

“After the elections, serious restrictions will be imposed on the exit of citizens from the country”

Political scientist Valery Solovey: we are in front of very serious political changes

Historian, political analyst, publicist Valery Solovey published a new book - “Absolute Weapon. Fundamentals of psychological warfare and media manipulation. Why do Russians lend themselves so easily to propaganda and how to “decode” them? Based on this, how will domestic political processes develop in the near future? What is the likely outcome of the election? Will our ties with the outside world change?

“In the manipulation of consciousness, Western democracies, Nazis and Soviets went the same way”

— Valery Dmitrievich, readers are wondering why you wrote another book on a question that has already been considered by dozens of other authors? For example, at one time the book by Sergei Kara-Murza "Manipulation of Consciousness" was popular. What mistakes and shortcomings do you see in it?

— In Russia, there is not a single worthy book that would talk about propaganda and media manipulation. Not a single one - I emphasize! famous book Kara-Murza became so popular only because she was the first in Russia on this topic. But in its methodological basis and content, it is frankly mediocre. Further, my book, for the first time in the literature, connects cognitive psychology with long-known stories about the methods, techniques and techniques of propaganda. So far, there has been no such analysis and generalization in the literature on this topic. Meanwhile, cognitivist psychology is extremely important because it explains why people are susceptible to propaganda and why propaganda is inevitable. As long as there is humanity, there will be propaganda. And, finally, it must be said that I covered the topic of propaganda with actual examples that are well understood by readers. The result was a book that was even noted by the leaders of the Russian propaganda machine. As my friends told me, they said about her: "The only worthwhile book in Russian on this topic." True, they added: “But it would be better if such a book did not come out at all.” I think this is a very high rating. In addition, the first edition was sold out in three weeks. Now the second one is coming out. Here is my answer to why I wrote this book.

Valery Solovey: “The first thing they pay attention to is hair. If a person is bald - on the eyes. A man needs to make sure he has good teeth and shoes.” from the personal archive of Valery Solovyov

- You once said that the concept of the Overton Window, which came from the West, revealing the secret mechanisms of the loosening of social norms, is nothing more than a pseudo-theory. Why?

“The Overton Window is a propaganda myth. And this concept itself is conspiratorial in nature: they say, there is a group of people who are planning a decades-long strategy to corrupt society. Never and nowhere in history has there been anything like it and cannot be, due to the imperfection of human nature. I suggest that a person who adheres to the concept of the Overton Window plan his life for at least a month and live according to his plan. Let's see what happens. Love for this kind of conspiracy is characteristic of those who are not even able to manage their own lives, let alone manage anything at all.

- In our country, the Overton Window is remembered when they point to problems with morality. Patriarch Kirill said so: "Pedophilia will be legalized for homosexuality."

- All changes in the history of mankind occur spontaneously. This does not mean that there is certainly some kind of conspiracy behind them and the legalization of homosexual marriages in some European countries will certainly lead to the legalization of pedophilia. In addition, in one case we are talking about adults who do something voluntarily, and in the other about minors who have parents, and the legalization of pedophilia is possible only through violation of human rights and violence. Therefore, yes, what was an anti-norm 100-200 years ago suddenly becomes acceptable today. But this is a natural process, there is no need to see here the “hairy paw of the Antichrist”, who came into this world to arrange Armageddon through homosexual marriages or something else.

At the same time, I want to say that in the same way, in a natural way, a reaction can occur. I do not at all rule out the possibility that European society may swing back towards conservative values. And not because a group of conspirators or Kremlin agents in Europe will be operating somewhere, but simply because the society decides enough is enough, they have played enough, you need to think about self-preservation.

“The leaders of the Russian propaganda machine said: “The only worthwhile book in Russian on this topic. But it would be better if it did not come out””pycode.ru

- Speaking of the manipulation of consciousness in our country, from what historical period can they be counted? Since the time of the Bolsheviks or even earlier?

- If we talk about manipulation in general, then from the moment people learned to speak. But if we are talking about mass manipulation, then from the moment the channels appeared mass communication. The starting point of mass deception can be considered the emergence of the media. This, of course, newspapers, radio, television. And in this sense, all more or less developed countries followed the same path, which Western democracies- USA, Great Britain and so on, that Nazi Germany, that Soviet Russia. Propaganda occurs in all countries without exception.

Another thing is the quality of propaganda, sophistication, the presence of pluralism. In the same USA, there are media holdings owned by various independent owners. Therefore, different propaganda campaigns balance each other and during the electoral "marathons" citizens have the freedom of choice. Well, or the illusion of freedom of choice. That is, where there is pluralism, propaganda is always more subtle and sophisticated.

— In one of your interviews, you said that the BBC is one of the most objective English-speaking television companies. Do you still think so?

— This company confirms such a reputation with its many years of work. All TV companies allow blunders, they are all dependent in one way or another, but the BBC suffers from this least of all.

“Russia managed to create the best propaganda machine”

- And our propaganda is more advanced and stupid?

“I wouldn't say so. Russia has managed to create, by far, the best propaganda machine. But it is focused exclusively on its own population, since propaganda outside was not very successful. At least in the European area. Our propaganda is carried out by very professional people. These people, in particular, learned from the information failure of the summer of 2008. Remember the war for South Ossetia, which Russia won militarily but, by all accounts, lost in terms of information and propaganda? Since 2014, we have seen that the propaganda errors of 2008 are no longer there.

But we must understand that any propaganda has its limits. Russian propaganda hit its limits at the turn of 2015-16. And we will gradually observe its extinction. Or, as they often say today, the refrigerator will gradually begin to win over the TV. I think that at the turn of 2016-17, its strength will weaken quite seriously.

- Today's diligent resuscitation of the cult of Stalin, for example, casts doubts ...

“You don't have to fight it. This will collapse on its own once the regime is weakened. Stalin in the current realities is nothing more than a propaganda symbol that has no real content and materializing power under it. Those who call on us to return Stalin believe that he should return only for their neighbors, but not for themselves. When it comes to selfish interests, none of these screaming Stalinists is ready to sacrifice anything. So the cult of Stalin is a fiction. It's just that the authorities are exploiting the era of Stalin in order to legitimize some of their repressive measures. But not more. There is a rule of complex social systems. It says that a return to the past, whoever wants it, is impossible.

RIA Novosti / Evgeny Biyatov

- But to Stalin, as if bewitched, with flowers go "both old and young." Can you tell us about the methods of decoding personal and social consciousness?

- Turn on common sense, judge people by their deeds, read more, do not watch TV at all, or no more than 20 minutes a day. If you are called to vote for a party that promised something 5-10 years ago and has not done anything by the current date, do not vote for it in any case. The deeds speak for themselves.

- And then, in the future, it is necessary to lustrate the employees of the propaganda media? What they do - crimes? Do they have to be held accountable?

- It is known that the Nuremberg Trials equated propaganda with a crime against humanity. Therefore, in a sense, this question can be answered in the affirmative. As for lustration, I do not rule it out, but it is too early to say who will be affected.

“The masses will come out, but this will not lead to civil war and the collapse of the state”

- This year, for the first time in a long time, the elections of half of the State Duma will be held in single-member districts. Can we expect that the pre-election campaign will become more diverse, and new faces will come to the Duma, enliven it, make it a "place for discussion"?

“Despite the fact that single-mandate constituencies have been returned, I think that all the same, the most dangerous ones for the preservation of the regime will simply not be allowed to participate in the elections. Even at the stage of registration, candidates go through a "sieve" that allows you to weed out those who are disloyal to the regime. And even if some of the undesirables are admitted to the elections, they will experience the most severe pressure and generally regret that they went. The elections will give the impression of competition, but not the competition itself, the message will be the same for everyone, just the style is different. Therefore, the Duma itself as a whole will retain its decorative character.

RIA Novosti/Alexander Utkin

- Do you see in the country, in principle, any real opposition to the regime, capable of leading the people?

There is an opposition in Russia that the regime allows to exist. Because any real opposition to them is destroyed in the literal and figurative sense. But even the weak opposition is afraid of the regime.

- In this case, the reader asks, how do you, a specialist in media manipulation, assess the chances of Putin's leadership to formalize and legitimize in the eyes of the population the transformation of Russia into a semi-closed, anti-democratic autocracy similar to the countries of Central Asia?

- Indeed, today the ruling group in Russia is concerned with the question of how to maintain its dominance until 2035-40. At least, I have heard arguments on this subject from people close to the so-called "elite". But I believe that in the next couple of years we will see the limit of the possibilities of this mode. I agree that its representatives will try to legitimize their power. But, one way or another, they will soon run out of opportunities for this.

— And what about “physical” measures, such as closing borders?

- After the elections to the State Duma this year, serious restrictions will most likely be introduced on the exit of Russian citizens from the country.

Do you mean the law on exit visas?

- No, it's unlikely. Unspoken recommendations will be given to officials at all levels and their families not to leave the country. And if the officials are so seriously infringed, they will not tolerate any part of society remaining free in the country. In Russia, if serfdom is introduced, it applies to all classes. This is a historical tradition. According to my information, a tourist tax will be introduced, which will cut off the opportunity for many categories of citizens to travel abroad.

fastpic.ru

- Will this be a factor that, on the contrary, will bring the collapse of the regime closer? After all, this step will affect not only the “creakles”, but also the townsfolk, who used to allow themselves to rest in decent hotels in Turkey, Egypt, Greece, Tunisia and so on for relatively little money.

— You are right, regimes are not collapsing because of opposition and external enemies. They collapse because of the stupidity of the managers. And sooner or later these stupidities begin to acquire a malignant character. If you look at the history of fallen regimes, you get the impression that those who ruled them, as if deliberately led the matter to collapse. In general, regarding any political processes in Russia, there is an axiom that the dynamics of the masses is unpredictable. And you can never know in advance what seemingly insignificant things can lead to major political shifts.

- Another reader's question is appropriate here: “What scenario is the most possible in Russia? The first is that Shoigu (or another conservative) becomes president, punitive and protective measures are tightened, that is, the transition to the USSR No. 2. The second is the Libyan scenario. The third is the Rose Revolution scenario. Fourth, peaceful evolution towards European democracy. Or the fifth, the collapse of the Russian Federation into many small states as a result of the current colonial pseudo-federal system?”

- What I definitely do not expect is the collapse of Russia. When they say this to me, I clearly understand what it is. pure water trade in fear. I believe that Russia is facing very serious political changes. They will happen in the not so distant medium term and will change our political landscape beyond recognition. These changes will be predominantly peaceful. And then we will move not very clear where. This will depend on the outcome of the changes.

- In the early 1990s, the masses also quite peacefully took to the streets and said: "We can't live like this anymore."

Yes, they will come out. And not for political reasons, but for socio-economic ones. I think that this is very likely, especially in large cities. But neither to civil war, it will not lead to the collapse of the state. I do not believe in this.

RIA Novosti/Alexey Danichev

“But when the protest is peaceful, it is easy to suppress it. No wonder a person asks you a question about Shoigu and the tightening of punitive and protective measures.

- The authorities are constantly moving in this direction, but do not exaggerate the loyalty of the repressive apparatus. She is not at all what she seems. In a critical situation, they simply can not follow the order and step back.

- Not the collapse of the country, but the disappearance of some regions, for example, the North Caucasus - is this possible?

— I don't think these republics want to leave Russia. In fact, they are good at it. Where should they go? Without it, they won't survive at all. Therefore, they will bargain, trying to impose their conditions. But as a result of political changes, I think Moscow's policy towards these republics will become more balanced and meaningful. Personally, I don't think it's right to pay huge sums of money for political loyalty. It's corrupting. Yes, and already corrupted.

“Our politicians use neo-Eurasianism and religion as long as it suits them”

- Do we still have sane nationalist, or rather national-democratic forces after the Ukrainian events?

- As for organized nationalism, it drags out a miserable existence. He is not allowed to raise his head, many leaders, like Belov, are behind bars. Others, like Demushkin, understand that if they are active, they will follow Belov. But as for nationalism in general as a kind of public mood, it certainly exists. And these sentiments will soon be politically in demand.

Are you going to revive your national-democratic New Force party when times are more favorable for public politics?

- It is frozen due to the fact that we were threatened with reprisals. But in general, I believe that both today and in the future the party format is unpromising. I think that other formats will be in demand.

RIA Novosti/Yuri Ivanov

- What are the prospects for the coming to power of members of the "January 25 Committee" Igor Strelkov and other "Novorossov"?

- There are different people in this organization: nationalists, and Soviet "imperials", and Orthodox monarchists. I do not see that this organization has any prospects. But some, some of its leaders, have. And I do not rule out that 2-3 of them will be able to play a role in the coming political changes that we talked about above.

- In general, do Russians have a chance to organize themselves following the example of Israel or Japan, that is, to create a national state? This is a question from one of our readers.

- Of course, there is such a chance, because the Russians feel like a single people. It is Russians, not Russians. So Russia is in fact, in fact, a nation state, it remains only to formalize the superstructure - the laws - in accordance with this reality and change the policy so that it coincides with the interests of the national majority.

Do you think Russians have a national identity these days?

— Yes, it exists, it manifests itself in everyday life. It's just that Russians are afraid to talk about it out loud. At least two-thirds of Russians feel their national consciousness. Just do not confuse real Russians and "literary" - national costumes, cuisine, tools, something else. It's just lubok. The nation state is modern state and not archaism.

“Moscow's policy towards these republics will become more balanced. Paying huge amounts of money for political loyalty is wrong.” RIA Novosti/Said Tsarnaev

The overwhelming majority of today's "Russian nationalists" are Orthodox activists and are convinced that the Russian national state must stand on the foundation of Orthodoxy, without it there is no way. Personally, this format of the nation-state is unpleasant to me. A multinational and cosmopolitan society is better, but secular and with freedom of worldview, including religious, choice.

- Your response is appropriate. But, firstly, if you are afraid, then it is better not to do anything at all, not even to leave the house. There is always a risk when doing something. And, secondly, the results of this process will depend on those who are at the head of it. Because there is a general sociological pattern: those at the bottom copy those at the top. And if the elite sets itself clear goals that are understandable and beneficial to the national majority, nothing terrible will happen.

Let's say you say: we want to provide affordable housing to the national majority in order to reverse the demographic situation. The bottoms answer: “Great! We want!” This is what the nation state is. But if someone, instead of clear and understandable goals, uses myths like “Stalinism” and says that it is precisely in it that the primordially Russian character and behavior of those in power are concentrated, then this is no longer a national state. This is completely different.

- And the “neo-Eurasianism”, which dominates the semi-official ideology of the ruling group, is this serious? What do you think - do they really believe in it or use it, like the same notorious "Stalinism"?

- To believe or not to believe - such a question in politics is not worth it. They find it convenient. It gives some ideological justification for what they do. They use it as long as it suits them. And religion, by the way, too. And if suddenly the weather vane of moods in society swings in the other direction, they will become Russian nationalists or even Muslims. Therefore, do not focus too much on this issue.

“Russia made no effort to keep Ukraine in the orbit of its influence”

— Since we have mentioned neo-Eurasianism, we will end our conversation with a series of questions about Ukraine: it is, perhaps, the main victim of the ideology of “neo-Eurasianism”, or the “Russian world”.

One of our readers recalls that Brzezinski is credited with saying: "Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire; with Ukraine, Russia automatically turns into an empire." That is, I would like to know your opinion: is the “shaggy paw of American imperialism” visible in the break in relations between Russia and Ukraine?

— I believe that the separation of Russia and Ukraine was a natural process. It began not two years ago, but in the early 1990s. And even then, many analysts said that Ukraine would inevitably drift towards the West. Moreover, Russia did not apply special efforts to keep Ukraine in the orbit of its influence. Or, at least, did not make the efforts that would be effective. I do not mean the supply of gas at reduced prices, but cultural and intellectual levers of influence. They were not used, and no one cared about that. So, I repeat, this is quite a natural process.

And after the annexation of Crimea to Russia, the war in the Donbass, the point of no return has been passed. Now Ukraine will definitely never be a fraternal state with Russia. At the same time, I do not think that the West will accept Ukraine either. Most likely, she will drag out a poor existence. But this does not mean that she will come to bow to Moscow. Anti-Moscow and anti-Russian sentiments will henceforth be the cornerstone for the formation of the national self-consciousness of Ukrainians. Here the question can be closed.

RIA Novosti/Andrey Stenin

“So Russia will never be an empire again?”

Well, this was understandable even in the 1990s, and not only in connection with Brzezinski's geopolitical views. And now we are at the point of post-Soviet existence. Rather, we are stuck there and do not develop anywhere. True, this inertia has already exhausted itself. Therefore political changes are inevitable.

- Is there an opportunity in the future to compromise on the “Crimean issue” in order to get rid of the sanctions?

“I think there is a chance to freeze this problem and ensure the de facto recognition of Crimea. As for the Crimean Tatars, there are not very many of them. And they can be offered such a formula, on the basis of which they would understand that it is better to live in the world. If they realize that there is no other alternative for them, then they will reconcile. This is quite enough. De jure recognition of Crimea Russian territory depends on the position of Ukraine. If we talk about sanctions against Russia, then there are those imposed for Crimea, and there are those for Donbass. And these are different sanctions. And the sanctions for Crimea are far from being the most sensitive.

- What, in your opinion, awaits Ukraine in general and Donbass in particular?

— The fate of Ukraine depends on the quality of its elite. If an elite appears there, capable of leading the country onto new tracks of development, then everything will be fine with it. I don't think it will break up or become a federation. But, one way or another, he will remain the "sick man of Europe."

The fate of Donbass is terrible. In any situation, he is doomed to be a kind of "black hole" on the geopolitical map. Most likely, it will turn out to be a peaceful territory, but de facto not part of Ukraine, nor part of Russia. It will be a region where crime, corruption, economic decline will reign - a kind of European Somalia. There is no point in modernizing something there, because no one really needs the Donbass. For Ukraine and for Russia, this is a stone on their feet. But people get used to everything. I have friends and relatives who live there, have already adapted to this lifestyle and do not want to leave.

RIA Novosti/Dan Levy

Reference

Valery Solovey was born in 1960. After graduating from the Faculty of History of Moscow State University, he worked at the Academy of Sciences, the Gorbachev Foundation. He completed an internship at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Doctor of Historical Sciences (dissertation topic - "The Russian Question" and its influence on the domestic and foreign policy of Russia). Currently, he is a professor at MGIMO, head of the department of public relations, author of a course of lectures on the manipulation of public consciousness.