Valery Solovey: “Kiriyenko made a number of mistakes. Political scientist Valery Solovey: "Putin will be elected and leave according to Yeltsin's scenario in two or three years" Valery Dmitrievich Solovey last

“Rumors spread around Moscow that the archive was being evacuated from the FSB building on Lubyanka by helicopters”

Five years have passed since the beginning of the mass protests that broke out in the capital in December 2011, after the announcement of the results of the elections to the State Duma. However, the question "what was it?" still does not have a definitive answer. According to MGIMO professor, political scientist and historian Valery Soloviev, this is an “attempt at a revolution” that had every chance of success.

Valery Solovey reflects on the origins and meaning of the Snow Revolution and the reasons for its defeat in an interview with MK.

Help "MK": “Recently, Valery Solovey published a book, the title of which will scare someone, and perhaps inspire someone: “Revolution! Fundamentals of the revolutionary struggle in the modern era. This work analyzes, first of all, the experience of "color" revolutions, to which the scientist ranks the Russian events of five years ago. The chapter dedicated to them is called "The Revolution Betrayed".

Valery Dmitrievich, judging by the abundance of reassuring forecasts issued on the eve of the 2011 Duma elections, the mass protests that followed them came as a complete surprise to many, if not most, politicians and experts. Tell me honestly: were they a surprise for you too?

No, they weren't a surprise to me. Back in the early autumn of 2011, my interview was published under the heading: "Soon the fate of the country will be decided on the streets and squares of the capital."

But in fairness, I will say that I am not the only one who turned out to be such a seer. Somewhere in the first half of September, I managed to talk with an employee of one of the Russian special services, who, on duty, is studying mass moods. I will not specify what kind of organization this is, but the quality of their sociology is considered very high. And I had a chance to make sure that this reputation is justified.

This man frankly told me then that since the beginning of the 2000s there had not been such an alarming situation for the authorities. I ask: "What, even mass unrest is possible?" He says: "Yes, it is possible." When asked what he and his department are going to do in this situation, my interlocutor replied: “Well, how what? We report to the authorities. But they don’t believe us. and that nothing will happen."

In addition, in the spring of 2011, the Center for Strategic Research, then headed by Mikhail Dmitriev, published a report that spoke of a high likelihood of public discontent in connection with the elections, up to mass protests. In a word, what happened was basically predicted. However, there is a huge gap between the categories "could happen" and "happen". Even if we say that something will happen with a high probability, it is not at all certain that it will happen. But in December 2011 it happened.

Vladimir Putin psychologically very accurately calculated the situation by choosing Dmitry Medvedev as his successor. No one else from Putin's entourage would have agreed to the "castling" that occurred after the end of the first presidential term, Valery Solovey is sure.

There is a version according to which the unrest was inspired by Medvedev and his inner circle. Is there any basis for such conspiracy theories?

Absolutely none. It is noteworthy that the core of the first protest action, which began on December 5, 2011 on Chistoprudny Boulevard, was made up of people who were election observers. They saw how it all happened, and had no doubt that the announced results were falsified. Only a few hundred people were expected to attend this first rally, but several thousand turned up. Moreover, they were very determined: they moved to the center of Moscow, breaking through the cordons of the police and internal troops. I personally observed these collisions. It was clearly visible that the behavior of the protesters turned out to be an unpleasant surprise for the police. She obviously did not expect such militancy from previously harmless hipsters.

It was an unadulterated moral protest. Spitting in the face of a man and demanding that he wipe himself off and perceive it as God's dew - and this is exactly what the behavior of those in power looked like - one should not be surprised at his indignation. Society, offended at first by Putin and Medvedev's "castling", was then shattered by the shameless manner in which the party in power tried to secure its monopoly position in parliament. Millions of people felt cheated.

Another thing is that some people from Medvedev's inner circle came up with the idea to use the rapidly expanding protest in the interests of their boss. And they got in touch with the leaders of the protest. According to some reports, Dmitry Anatolyevich was invited to speak on December 10, 2011 at a rally on Bolotnaya Square. And, so to speak, to replay the situation with the "castling". But Medvedev did not dare to do so. These rumors, however, were enough for a version of a conspiracy to be born in the heads of the Chekists, in which Medvedev participated on the one hand, and the West on the other.

I repeat, there are no grounds for such suspicions. However, the consequence of this version was that Putin had doubts about Medvedev's loyalty for a long time. The fact that he, so to speak, is pure in his thoughts and does not hatch "treacherous" plans. As far as we know, the suspicions were finally removed only a year and a half ago. But today, Putin, on the contrary, considers Medvedev a man who can be completely trusted. What manifested itself, in particular, in the situation with. The attack on the government was planned much larger. But, as we know, the president publicly confirmed his confidence in the government and personally in Medvedev, and thus drew a “red line” for the security forces.

The then calculations of the "conspirators" were clean water projected or did they rely on Medvedev's position?

I think that they acted on their own, hoping that the situation would "steer" in a favorable direction for their boss and, accordingly, for themselves. I am sure that Medvedev did not and could not give them such a sanction. This is not the psychological type.

By the way, there are different points of view on how Medvedev reacted to his "non-re-approval" as president. Someone, for example, believes that he had absolutely no reason to be upset: he brilliantly played in a play written at the time of his nomination for the presidency.

I do not believe in such a long and echeloned conspiracy theories. I have a feeling - and not only me - that Dmitry Anatolyevich was still going to be re-elected. But he found himself in a situation where he had to abandon this idea. A psychologically stronger partner broke him.

- And he resignedly obeyed?

Well, not completely resigned, of course. It must have been a personal tragedy. Sergei Ivanov, of course, would not behave like that. And no one else from Putin's entourage. In this sense, Vladimir Vladimirovich psychologically very accurately calculated the situation, the choice was made correctly.

However, the future looked different in 2007 than in 2011. There were some important and still hidden from the public circumstances that did not allow us to say with certainty that castling will occur in 2011.

You call the mass protest movement in Russia an "attempt at revolution." But today the prevailing point of view is that the circle of these revolutionaries was terribly narrow and they were terribly far from the people, and therefore did not pose a real threat to power. Like, the rest of Russia remained indifferent to this Moscow intelligentsia "Decembrist uprising", which therefore was nothing more than a storm in a teacup.

This is not true. It is enough to look at the results of sociological surveys made at the same time, in hot pursuit. Look: at the moment the protests began, almost half of Muscovites, 46 percent, approved the opposition's actions in one way or another. They were negatively treated by 25 percent. Only a quarter. And categorically against even less - 13 percent.

Another 22 percent found it difficult to determine their attitude or declined to answer. This is the data of the Levada Center. It is also indicative that 2.5 percent of the capital's residents declared their participation in the rally on Bolotnaya Square on December 10, 2011.

Judging by these data, the number of participants should have been at least 150,000. In fact, there were half as many - about 70 thousand. From this funny fact, it follows that at the end of 2011, participation in protests was considered an honorable thing. A kind of symbolic privilege. And remember how many representatives of the Russian elite were at these winter rallies. And Prokhorov came, and Kudrin, and Ksenia Sobchak pushed on the podium ...

- But outside of Moscow, the mood was different.

Until now, all revolutions in Russia have developed according to the so-called central type: you seize power in the capital, and after that the whole country is in your hands. Therefore, what they thought at that moment in the province does not matter at all. For elections it matters, for a revolution it doesn't. This is first.

Secondly, the mood in the provinces did not differ so much from those in the capital at that time. According to a poll by the Public Opinion Foundation conducted throughout the country in mid-December 2011, the demand to cancel the results of the elections to the State Duma and hold a repeat vote was shared by 26 percent of Russians. This is a lot. Less than half, 40 percent, did not support this demand. And only 6 percent believed that the elections were held without fraud.

Obviously, the population of large cities fluctuated. It could well have taken the side of Moscow's hipster revolutionaries if they had acted more decisively.

In short, it can not be called a "storm in a teacup". In fact, on December 5, 2011, a revolution began in Russia. The protest covered more and more territory of the capital, every day more and more people were involved in it. Society expressed ever more visible sympathy for the protesters. The police were running out of steam, the authorities were confused and frightened: even the phantasmagoric scenario of storming the Kremlin was not ruled out.

Rumors spread around Moscow that the archive was being evacuated from the FSB building on Lubyanka by helicopters. It is not known how true they were, but the very fact of such rumors says a lot about the then mass mood in the capital. During at least two weeks of December the situation was extremely favorable for the opposition. All the conditions were in place for a successful revolutionary action.

It is noteworthy that the protest developed rapidly, despite the fact that the government-controlled media, especially television, adhered to a policy of strict information embargo against opposition actions. The thing is that the opposition has a "secret weapon" - social networks. It was through them that she campaigned, alerted and mobilized her supporters. I cannot fail to notice, by the way, that since then the value social networks grew even more.

As Donald Trump's recent campaign has shown, they can already win elections. I analyze this experience of using social networks in my classes with my students and in public workshops.

- Where and when was the move made in this game that predetermined the loss of the opposition?

I think if on December 10 the rally, as previously scheduled, had taken place on Revolution Square, events would have developed in a completely different way.

That is, Eduard Limonov is right when he claims that the protest began to be “leaked” at the moment when the leaders agreed to change the place of the action?

Absolutely. At least twice as many people would have come to Revolution Square than to Bolotnaya Square. And if you are familiar with the topography of Moscow, then you can easily imagine what 150,000 people are protesting in the very heart of the capital, a stone's throw from parliament and the Central Election Commission. Mass dynamics is unpredictable. One or two calls from the podium of the rally, spontaneous movement among its participants, awkward actions of the police - and a giant crowd moves towards the State Duma, the Central Election Commission, the Kremlin ... The authorities understood this very well, so they did everything in order to move the rally to Bolotnaya. And opposition leaders came to the aid of the authorities. Moreover, in fact, they saved this power. The consent to change Revolution Square to Bolotnaya meant, in essence, the refusal to fight. And politically, and morally, psychologically, and symbolically.

- What was the name of the yacht, so did it sail?

Quite right. Nevertheless, the opposition still had the opportunity to turn the tide of events both in January and February, right up to the presidential elections. If instead of fruitless chanting "We are the power here", "We will come again" some actions were taken, the situation could well unfold.

- What do you mean by actions?

All successful revolutions began with the creation of the so-called liberated territory. In the form of, for example, streets, squares, quarters.

- A la Maidan?

Maidan is one of the historical modifications of this technology. In all revolutions, it is critically important for revolutionaries to create a foothold, a foothold. If we take, for example, the Chinese revolution, which developed according to a peripheral type, then there a foothold was created in the remote provinces of the country. And for the Bolsheviks during the October Revolution, Smolny was such a territory. Sometimes they stay on the bridgehead for a long time, sometimes events unfold very quickly. But it all starts with this. You can gather even half a million people, but it won't matter if the people just stood still and dispersed.

It is important that the quantitative dynamics be supplemented by political, new and offensive forms of struggle. If you say: "No, we are standing here and will stand until our demands are met," then you are taking a significant step forward. Attempts to follow this path were made on March 5, 2012 on Pushkin Square and on May 6 on Bolotnaya. But then it was too late - the window of opportunity had closed. The March and post-March situation was fundamentally different from the December one. If society had serious and justified doubts about the legitimacy parliamentary elections, then Putin's victory in the presidential elections looked more than convincing. Even the opposition did not dare to challenge it.

But December, I emphasize, was an exceptionally convenient moment for the opposition. The mass rise of the protest movement was combined with the confusion of the authorities, who were quite ready to make serious concessions. However, by mid-January, the mood of the ruling group had changed dramatically. The Kremlin and the White House came to the conclusion that, despite the great mobilization potential of the protest, its leaders are not dangerous. That they are cowardly, unwilling and even afraid of power, and that they are easily manipulated. And one can only agree with this. It suffices to recall the fact that New Year almost all the opposition leaders went on holiday abroad.

One of those people who formulated the political strategy of the authorities at that time told me the following after the fact: “On December 9-10, we saw that the opposition leaders were stupid. And in early January, we were convinced that they value their own comfort above power. And then they decided: We will not share power, but we will crush the opposition." I am quoting almost verbatim.

- And how far was the government ready to go in its concessions? What could the opposition possibly count on?

Concessions to the government would be directly proportional to the pressure on it. True, I do not really believe that the opposition could then win a complete victory - come to power. But it was quite realistic to achieve a political compromise.

It is known, for example, that in the corridors of power the possibility of holding snap parliamentary elections after the presidential ones was discussed. But after the leaders of the opposition showed a complete lack of strategy and will, this idea was removed from the agenda. However, I'm not going to blame anyone for anything. If God did not give volitional qualities, then He did not. As the French say, they have such a frivolous saying, even the most beautiful girl can't give more than what she has.

The art of a politician is to see a historical chance, and not to push off from it with hands and feet. History rarely provides an opportunity to change something, and it is usually unmerciful to those politicians who miss their chance. She did not spare the leaders of the "Snow Revolution", as these events are sometimes called. Navalny was prosecuted, his brother ended up in prison. Vladimir Ryzhkov lost his party, Gennady Gudkov lost his deputy mandate. Boris Nemtsov left us altogether... All these people thought that fate would give them another, better opportunity. But in a revolution, the best is the enemy of the good. There may not be another chance.

It seems to me that the psychological pattern of the "Snow Revolution" was largely predetermined by the phenomenon of August 1991. For some it was a miracle of victory, for others it was a terrible trauma of defeat. The Chekists, who saw how the monument to Dzerzhinsky was being destroyed, who were sitting in their offices at that time and were afraid that a crowd would burst into them, have lived since then with fear: "Never more, we will never allow this again." And the liberals - with the feeling that one day the power itself will fall into their hands. As then, in 1991: they didn’t hit a finger on a finger, but ended up on a horse.

Let us imagine that the opposition would succeed in holding repeated parliamentary elections. How would this affect the development of the situation in the country?

I think that even with the most honest count of votes, the liberals would not be able to gain control over the State Duma. A total of 15, at most 20 percent of the seats would be content. Nonetheless, politic system would become much more open, flexible, competitive. And as a result, a lot of what happened in subsequent years would not have happened.

We would now live in a completely different country. This is the logic of the system: if it closes, loses its internal dynamism, competition, if there is no one who could challenge the authorities, then the authorities can make any decisions. Including - strategically erroneous. I can say that in March 2014 most of the elite was horrified by the decisions made then. In real fear.

- However, the majority of the country's population perceives the events of March 2014 as a great blessing.

In my opinion, the attitude of the majority of the country's population to this was best and most accurately described by the talented playwright Yevgeny Grishkovets: the annexation of Crimea was illegal, but fair. It is clear that no one can return Crimea to Ukraine. This would not have been possible even for the Kasparov government, if by some miracle it had come to power. But for society, Crimea has already been played out as a topic; it is not present in everyday discourse today.

If in 2014-2015 the problem of Crimea divided the opposition, stood up as an insurmountable wall, now it is simply taken out of the brackets. By the way, I would not be at all surprised at the restoration of the protest coalition that arose in 2011 and included both liberals and nationalists. As far as I know, this recovery is already underway.

How likely is it that in the foreseeable future we will see something similar to what the country experienced during that revolutionary winter?

I think that the probability is quite high. Although probability, as I said, does not mean inevitability. After the suppression of the 2011-2012 revolution, the system stabilized. The internal "capitulators", as the Chinese would call them, realized that they had to sniff into a rag and follow in the wake of the leader, the national leader.

At the end of 2013, when a system of repressive measures began to take shape in the country, there was a feeling that the regime had cemented everything, that nothing would break through this concrete. But, as is usually the case in history, everywhere and always the power itself provokes a new dynamic that undermines stability. First - Crimea, then - Donbass, then - Syria ...

It's not the Americans planted, not the opposition. Initiating geopolitical dynamics of this magnitude, you must be aware that it will inevitably affect the socio-political system. And we see that this system is becoming more and more unstable. Which is manifested, in particular, in the growing nervousness within the Russian elite, in mutual attacks, in the war of compromising materials, in the growth of social tension.

The turbulence of the system is growing. By the way, the revolution that took place in our country at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s has not ended in terms of the criteria of historical sociology. We are still living in a revolutionary epoch, and new revolutionary paroxysms are by no means excluded.

- Andrey Zayakin from Dissernet found that in Russia forty thousand criminal cases and arrests are very likely related to the fact that drugs were planted and the case was falsified. Is there a chance of new high-profile cases after the "release of steam" on such a super-resonant topic, when people really finally unite, and it will not matter at all what these or other opinion leaders think - people will still take to the streets?

— I believe that the chances of this are very high and moreover, it is inevitable. What we are now seeing is the formation of massive new rights. This is somewhat similar to what happened in 2011, well, we will not take 2012, the dynamics there were already high. That after all, a considerable group of people is ready to leave, despite the fact that they are trying to bring down the dynamics on this, despite the fact that these people are being pressured. In other words, society is changing right before our eyes. The readiness for mobilization is much greater than six months ago. Much more. She will grow. But in order for this readiness to turn into something effective, it is necessary to practice, that is, to take to the streets.

Willingness to take risks will increase when people see something new. As soon as we feel that there are several tens of thousands of us, and moreover, when these several tens of thousands behave a little more organized, and there are chances for this, that is, some kind of organizing principle appears, then the behavior of these people will be different. Not immediately, but gradually, such three or four mass actions will be required in order for people to start behaving differently, and the flip side is for the police to become afraid of them. I am talking about this quite thoroughly: there are not many police, riot police in Moscow. And it is quite possible to force them to keep their distance, at least to force them to stop the atrocities that they demonstrated on June 12th.

- Well, there was a feeling that the entire personnel was expelled.

- Only half, the list of riot police in Moscow is only three thousand people. But these are drivers, including clerical workers, in reality there are not many of them, do you understand? And as soon as twenty-five to thirty thousand people take to the streets who are ready to resist, who have some kind of organizing principle, the situation will change.

- Valery Dmitrievich, already on the day of our broadcast, I had the following observation: in particular, on Strastnoy Boulevard, I saw that people know that they are being screwed, but they are not afraid of it, they are ready for it. Moreover, I saw how young guys just clearly got into a clutch in order to grab each other's hands and make it difficult, let's say, to isolate someone from the crowd. So did the older women.

— Yes, the older women were determined. The situation has changed in our heads, it is changing, and in order for this change in our heads to become part of our behavior, some more time must pass. Some processes take time to mature. But that time is no longer infinitely far away. I can say that next year already, I'm not sure about this one, but next year we will see new political behavior.

- Is this the same cumulative effect, Valery Dmitrievich, that everyone is talking about?

- Maybe. Look, it's all starting to pay off. Look, we talked six months ago, a year ago - yes, irritation and hatred are accumulating, people's consciousness is starting to change, and it is starting to change very quickly. Since the autumn of last year, people have undergone a colossal evolution, namely a political one. And now they write to me from Tuapse: “We used to sell T-shirts with Putin on the beach, they were quite popular, but this year they don’t sell them. This seems to be a funny observation, but it seems to me a more accurate indicator than sociology. Because this is a marketing classic: they don’t sell what is not in demand.These small merchants perfectly feel the mood of society, the mood of people who come, and not the poorest people come to Anapa, because vacationing on the Black Sea coast is more expensive than in Turkey.

- In this regard, the question is, look, the authorities are monitoring the situation, they are aware of themselves. But why, at the same time, such a stupid attack on wallets and on the rights of people continues? I mean raising the retirement age, VAT, against this background, some absolutely wild stories with infill development in the yards, it is clear that they are corrupt, it is clear that there are some fraudulent stories with land surveying, then all these landfills - also corruption stories. Why somehow they do not want to slow down a little bit? Do they understand that people will inevitably take to the streets, because there is simply nowhere else to go?

- Here you yourself said the key word - stupid. What do you want from stupid and greedy people? Here are two factors that drive them: the lack of ability to think strategically, and the second is greed. They understand that the matter is coming to an end, it is necessary to grab as much as possible now. It's now character psychology feature a significant part of domestic officials - at least those on whom the solution of economic issues depends. And thirdly, they have experience, they are used to the fact that people do not resist. Remember, we discussed this several times? They go by experience. And when they run into resistance, which turns out to be very effective and irreversible, then the line will be surpassed, violated, and, as it turns out, it will be impossible to win back. Those people that we are now warning privately or publicly, as now, they will run in terror. And nothing can be done. Even now, I know, a month and a half ago, for the first time I was told about this by high-ranking officials that "things are heading towards disaster." A year ago they didn't say anything like that, but a month and a half ago they said: "We feel, but we can't do anything."

- Well, nothing, just on Friday evening, after the end of the working day, a gorgeous letter appeared on social networks. Writes the district head of the Center for Combating Extremism of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, from the northwestern district. He writes to the head of the administration of the Northern Tushino district: they say, you know, various troublemakers are now traveling all over Moscow, engaged in propaganda processing of residents and destabilization. Literally, he wrote as follows: “various political and public associations, opposition groups of citizens are carrying out propaganda actions aimed at drawing the attention of residents to the problems of improvement and renovation in their places of residence,” that is, the discussion by Muscovites of poor-quality improvement and sawing is already equated with extremism.

- What do you want, there is such a wonderful Russian saying: "Fools are not sown and not plowed. They will be born themselves." Do these people need to prove and justify their own existence? They cannot say that the Moscow authorities are to blame with their predatory and thoughtless and insane policy of plundering all the resources that this city has. And there are a lot of resources here. And violence against Muscovites, because all the authorities don't give a damn about Muscovites and their opinion.

“Maybe it’s just systematic work, Valery Dmitrievich?”

— If only it were so! This is reminiscent of the Soviet joke: "On the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the October Revolution, posthumously award Nicholas II with the Order of Lenin for shaping the revolutionary situation." I see people who intensively shape this situation, but they do it unintentionally, I know this for sure. They do it out of stupidity, greed, or because they don't care at all. Because the main thing is to send them a report to the authorities so that they are not touched, and solve their own, mainly commercial tasks. The information that is sent to the federal center from the regions that goes to the Kremlin is distorted, it is false, it does not correspond to reality through any of the channels. That is, only that which corresponds to the picture of the world of the people making the decision is sent.

- Well, it seemed to us that for more than a year the authorities have been catching local activists in the yards and for some reason recklessly sewing "rally" articles for them. It seems that this is the handwriting of the "Eshniks". That is, why would a resident detained in the yard suddenly be charged with a rally? Or a janitor who came to fight for his labor rights against the theft of his salary - they also write that he allegedly went to a rally.

- The methods of work of special services with political activists are now being transferred to regional activists who solve their local problems. Second, these methods receive encouragement from their own bosses, from the central government, since a strategic decision has been made to pursue a "hard course". Therefore, there is no need to flatter yourself about the Golunov case, the course will be tough. They will react to the speeches of troublemakers, "incited by the West", as "befits". It just becomes difficult, because it is very difficult to blame a resident of Chemodanovka, residents of Urdoma, the Arkhangelsk region as a whole, residents of Syktyvkar, that they are incited by the West or Navalny.

Russian political scientist - about Ulyukaev's hope, Kadyrov's pacification and Putin's pause

For some six months, the main memes on the Russian political agenda have become “request for change” and “image of the future”, which were well known before only to readers of the Zavtra newspaper. The well-known historian, political scientist and publicist Valery Solovey spoke in an interview with Realnoe Vremya about what fills these memes with content, namely about the growing political activity of citizens, the confusion of the elites, and the hidden function of Ramzan Kadyrov.

Appeals from the regions were left to chance: react as you wish

Valery Dmitrievich, you recently wrote on your Twitter that the situation in the country is being shaken up not by a conspiracy, but by “stupidity and methodologists.” Apparently, they meant the "Shchedrovites" and their main public representative Sergei Kiriyenko? What exactly were the mistakes made by the presidential administration under him?

Yes, they meant advisers close to Kiriyenko from the group of “methodologists”. According to the general opinion (by the general opinion I mean the opinion of Moscow political experts and people close to the administration of the President of the Russian Federation), they failed to determine the correct political line of conduct and made a number of missteps. Associated, for example, with the reaction to the events of March 26 and June 12 and, in general, the reaction to the Navalny phenomenon. Do you remember, say, a video in which Navalny is compared to Hitler, or a song by Alice Vox, in which an appeal is made to schoolchildren not to go to rallies, but “start with yourself”. It is clear that the legs in this case grew out of the administration. And all this worked to the benefit of Alexei Anatolyevich. I'm not talking about more serious things, when requests from the regions with a request to suggest how they should react to Navalny's upcoming actions were actually left to chance: react as you wish. This is despite the fact that the vast majority of Russian regions (Tatarstan is an exception in this case) need an understanding of the Kremlin's position and clear instructions.

This is one part of the problem. The second is that people who are tightly integrated into the presidential administration are less and less appreciative of its ability to solve problems that confront the country and specifically the Kremlin. And there is some contradiction here, because personally they rate Sergei Kiriyenko quite highly. But at the same time, they note that, at least until the summer of this year, he was not able to establish an effective work of the administration. Perhaps this was due to internal opposition. Not everything was fine there, he had conflicts with other prominent apparatchiks. Either he took a long time to get used to, or the point is that when he agreed to go into administration, there was one situation in the country, and now, starting from the early spring of this year, there has been a political revival. That is, a different situation has developed, and it was still necessary to comprehend it, understand what was happening, and propose how to deal with it.

“It was an ‘offer you can’t refuse’, nevertheless Kiriyenko was probably promised a reward if he did his job effectively, that is, he successfully carried out presidential campaign". Photo kremlin.ru

- So, Kiriyenko was invited to this position? Didn't he really want her?

It was "an offer you can't refuse," but Kiriyenko was probably promised a reward if he did his job effectively, that is, successfully ran the presidential campaign. What kind of reward, I do not know, but you can guess that we are talking about a post in the government. Maybe about the position of the head of the cabinet. Indeed, for the head of Rosatom, the transition to the position of deputy head of the presidential administration is a loss of status, independence and a significant complication of life.

The elite is accumulating tension, discontent and fear

The trial has begun former minister economic development Russia Alexei Ulyukaev, where the defendant has already accused the head of Rosneft Igor Sechin of provoking a bribe. What else do you think we can hear about this trial?

In fact, we haven't heard anything interesting yet. For political Moscow, Ulyukaev's statement is no secret - this scenario was discussed long before the trial. More precisely, not a script, but the background of events.

And I think that nothing else awaits us. Ulyukaev, of course, will not reveal any Kremlin secrets, because for him this is fraught with a worsening of the situation. I think he still hopes that his article will be reclassified to a less serious one, and he will receive a suspended sentence. Or it will be released under the planned amnesty on the occasion of the centenary of the October Revolution. But the fact that there will be no acquittal is absolutely certain.

- It will be a great irony of fate if it comes out on the occasion of the centenary of October.

Well, in Russia everything is already permeated not even with irony, but with the grotesque. Look at the story of Poklonskaya - it's something Kafkaesque. Or rather, Gogol, Saltykov-Shchedrin.

“I think that nothing else awaits us. Ulyukayev, of course, will not reveal any Kremlin secrets, because for him this is fraught with a worsening of the situation. Photo iz.ru

How would you comment on Aleksey Venediktov's suggestion that Sergey Chemezov is behind Ulyukaev's statement?

Yes, anyone can stand. In general, Alexei Alekseevich has a sound idea. Chemezov and Sechin are opponents. And if they are opponents, then Chemezov, as an influential person, can somehow support Ulyukaev so that life does not seem like honey to Igor Ivanovich. But even if Chemezov is behind Ulyukaev's statement, this does not mean that the verdict will be acquittal. The prosecution will get its way, there is no doubt about it. Ulyukaev will definitely not be able to leave the courtroom with a clean, unsullied reputation. Above Russian court it is quite possible to write, as over Dante's hell: "Abandon hope, ye who enter here." This is just such a hopeless place.

All the fuss will be around what exactly Ulyukaev will receive - imprisonment, a suspended sentence or an amnesty.

That is, about some tectonic shifts, about the "split of the elites", as Dmitry Gudkov suggested, this court does not tell us?

There is no split. A split in the elites is when different groups of the elite see differently how to build a strategy for the development of the country and society, and not when they fight for resources. A split in the Russian elite will arise in one single case - when very powerful pressure will be exerted on the central government from below in the form of popular demonstrations. That's when the elite will have doubts about its political future and there will be different variants this future.

- Can foreign political pressure split it?

No, he can not. It can cause - and is already causing - growing tension. But this does not mean that any of them, let alone any group, will dare to openly oppose Putin if he decides to go to the polls. This is absolutely out of the question.

So far, quantitative rather than qualitative changes are taking place in the Russian elite. There is an accumulation of tension, discontent and fear. The latter is caused by the clause in the US sanctions law, which involves investigating the connections of parastatal structures of oligarchs with the Kremlin. And there, not only the oligarchs themselves, but also members of their families fall under the law. This is what they are very afraid of. But these are moods, emotions. There are no actions.

“It does two things. The first is to maintain stability in Chechnya and maintain stability in the North Caucasus. He is the personal guarantor of stability in this region. And the second is to act as a support for the regime in the event of mass unrest.” Photo kremlin.ru

“We will face many local protests that will gradually merge into a nationwide one”

- What role does Ramzan Kadyrov play in the Russian elite, who is already there was a lot, and recently it has become even more?

It performs two functions. First, maintain stability in Chechnya and maintain stability in the North Caucasus. He is the personal guarantor of stability in this region. And the second is to act as a support for the regime in the event of mass unrest.

- Unrest in Moscow, you mean?

If the unrest begins, they are likely to take on a nationwide character. That is, they can cover several cities.

When he, say, talks about his key role in the "Crimean Spring" (as it is claimed in social networks), is this agreed with the Kremlin?

Hardly. He considers himself a strong independent figure. Kadyrov is by far the most powerful regional leader Russian Federation, significantly more influential than all the others. Accordingly, he allows himself what no one, including major federal figures, can afford.

What is the reason for the statement of the head of the VTsIOM, Valery Fedorov, that the request for stability in Russian society has been replaced by a request for change? Especially in light of the fact that Fedorov considers this phase dangerous, I quote: "Revolutionary moods appear not in a situation of crisis, but when the crisis is over."

The very request for change after a twenty-year, if not more, request for stability is a very serious, almost tectonic shift. But what consequences it will lead to, we will find out not immediately, but within two to three years. Because it is not enough to change people's minds - it is much more important that their political behavior change. We have signs of such political novelty - this is the participation of people in unauthorized actions, and the phenomenon of Navalny. This is what Gleb Pavlovsky called politicization.

“It is not enough to change people's minds - it is much more important that their political behavior change. We have signs of such political novelty - this is the participation of people in unauthorized actions, and the phenomenon of Navalny. Photo by Oleg Tikhonov

Only we must be aware that the mass dynamics is absolutely and fundamentally unpredictable. We do not know how political activity will develop. I am inclined to believe that it will go on increasing, that is, we will face many local protests that will gradually merge into a nationwide one. And I do not rule out that the beginning of this will be laid next fall.

And the political crisis itself, if we enter into it, and it seems that we are slowly drawn into it, will last at least two years, more likely even three years. But this is still under a big question mark. Because a change in behavior does not automatically follow from a change in the mood of citizens.

Perhaps the very appearance of such a statement from the head of a pro-government sociological structure suggests that the authorities themselves are trying to ride this wave?

No, the authorities are trying to protect themselves from it. She just understands that this is a threat. Saddle - how is it?

- Lead the renovation process yourself.

This could have been done if new person with a fundamentally new national agenda. Which would offer an image of the future. Or if Putin suggested it. That is, if we saw the new Putin. Practically it is impossible, but theoretically it cannot be ruled out.

That is, do you think that Putin will still go to the polls, but will arm himself with some kind of vague agenda?

You know, we'll know for sure whether he goes or not, not until October. Until now, there are doubts, albeit microscopic ones. Although everything he does is very reminiscent of an election campaign. However, until he personally announces that he is going to the polls, doubts will persist.

“You know, we will know for sure whether he will go or not, not earlier than October. Until now, there are doubts, albeit microscopic ones. Although everything he does is very reminiscent of an election campaign.” Photo kremlin.ru

In the meantime, he says: “I think. I have not decided yet". Maybe he did, but he hides it. Or maybe he didn't really decide. I can only say that this pause causes some confusion among the political elite. She would have preferred certainty, and the sooner the better.

"Then why do you think he won't announce it before October?"

It's not my opinion, it's what they think, as far as is known, in the inner circle. But again, these are all rumors. He did not announce this during the "straight line". They say that in October it will become clear that Putin has promised to introduce it. Or maybe he will bring it in November.

Ending to be

Rustem Shakirov

- We are talking on the day of Dzhabrailov's arrest...

Arrest already? No detention?

- So far, the detention, but the charge has been brought: hooliganism. Shot in a hotel. Four seasons. At Red Square.

Well, that's okay. I think they will let go. The maximum is a subscription. (While he was writing, he was released on a subscription. Either someone knocks on him, or he writes the script himself. - D. B.)

- But before he was generally untouchable ...

Yes, there will be no inviolable now, except for the narrowest circle. The problem is not that there are no institutions in Russia, but that a typical Russian institution - the roof - stops working. A month ago, they hinted to me that two banks were under attack - Otkritie and another, considered ethnic, and that there would not be enough funds to save both. The Opening has just been rescued. So the rest of the can get ready? And there is such a roof!

- What about Kadyrov? They don't want to change it?

It has been wanted to be replaced for a long time.

- After the assassination of Nemtsov?

After the assassination of Nemtsov, he even left Russia for a while. But the idea was even earlier, even, they say, they found a replacement - but that person had not been to Chechnya for a long time and did not come up. However, for Kadyrov it would be an honorable dismissal: it was about the status of Deputy Prime Minister. But no portfolio.

- Did Chechnya know about this supposed change?

Yes. And Kadyrov, of course, knew. After all, his famous phrase that he is "Putin's infantryman" means a readiness to obey any order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Has Putin already made a firm decision to go to the polls?

Judging by the fact that the election campaign is in full swing, yes. Actually, everything became clear when meetings with young people began: the Kremlin realized that they were missing them. However, the president meets with young people not only out of duty: he seems to like to communicate with them.

- And them?

Im not sure.

- Why, I wonder: Schubert, syphilis ...

Schubert had syphilis. And there were problems with women. But still, young people are more interested in something else, and Putin does not speak their language exactly. His PR does not look brilliant at all yet: a photo shoot with a naked torso is not the most successful replica of a ten-year-old photoset.

- Do you think this is the deadline - or will it stay forever?

I think that this is not even a deadline, but a transit. He gets elected and leaves Yeltsin's scenario in two or three years.

When four years ago Khodorkovsky gave such a forecast - just to Sobesednik - everyone laughed, but today it is almost a commonplace ...

Well, it's definitely not funny anymore. There are signs that the situation is getting out of control. How exactly it will turn out, how traumatic it will be, is still unclear: in such historical bindings there is always a colossal number of unknown variables, and they are added. There is a smooth scenario - something like a replay of December 31, 1999. There is a non-smooth but peaceful scenario - involving the street, but without violence. As the events of 1991 and 1993 show, the army is extremely reluctant to shoot at compatriots. Well, if, God forbid, blood is shed, then the experience of the Kyiv Maidan shows that even a peaceful revolution after the first people killed drastically changes its character. In Kyiv, about 120 people were killed, and after that the Yanukovych regime was doomed, no matter what conditions and compromises he then made. If everything goes smoothly, Putin will simply hand over power to a successor.

- Shoigu?

Hardly. There is no complete, unconditional trust in Shoigu. It seems that the President and the Minister of Defense are very close, but the impression is that along with attraction there is some kind of psychological repulsion. Perhaps because Putin and Shoigu are similar in something very important: a certain messianism is inherent in both. At the same time, Shoigu is almost the most popular minister of Russia, which is a considerable merit of his brilliant, since the time of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, PR service. True, I will never at all believe that, despite his messianism, the Minister of Defense is capable of some kind of daring independent action.

- Rogozin?

Of course not. He probably really wanted it.

- Then who?

The security forces - both the army and the special services - are discussing Dyumin's candidacy as a foregone conclusion.

- And what is Dyumin-president?

I highly doubt his ability to hold on and keep the situation. You see, Putin's system is a system tailored personally (I emphasize: personally!) for Putin. It's a pyramid on top, shaky but holding on. If the top is removed, the pyramid will fall, but how it falls is already unpredictable.

- And then the territorial collapse?

Lord, what kind of territorial disintegration? Why all of a sudden, where? The country is held by three, sorry for the expression, braces, each of which would be quite enough. Russian language. Russian ruble. Russian culture. The main thing is that no one is rushing out of the Russian Federation, even in Tatarstan centrifugal forces insignificant - they can ask for some symbolic preferences at most ... Even the North Caucasus, the most dangerous region in this sense, does not understand who to stick to outside of Russia and how to live.

- And who can come to power if a successor does not hold out? Fascists?

Firstly, I would not even call them “fascists”, because they have no real ideology, no program, no organization. They are capable of giving interviews, but they are not able to build a working organization. In addition, they are now driven underground and rather demoralized. Secondly, if they are allowed to be elected to parliament, they will receive five to seven percent (this is even in the best scenario for them). And I am in favor of introducing them to the parliament - it is very civilizing and reduces the level of danger. There can be no fascism now, because everyone is too lazy. Remember real fascism: Italy, Germany - a colossal strain of forces. And now, in general, no one wants to strain, there are no ideas, and such things are not done without an idea. And those whom you call "fascists" have the whole entourage from the last century, they did not provide any qualitative novelty.

- Do you also rule out mass repressions?

What about the meaning?

- Pure pleasure.

Even the generals of the FSB will not get real pleasure from this, whether it's a personal yacht. And even more so their children. I understand why you are asking about repressions, but the Serebrennikov case is just an attempt by the security forces to show who is the boss here. So unobtrusively. And then some have already thought that they can influence the first person. No one can, and then - the first person in eternity, in History. And here and now the security forces are in control. How did they chant at opposition rallies in 2012? "We are the power here!"

- And it seemed to me that this was a dig under Surkov.

Nothing threatens Surkov. He is just inviolable, because he conducts all the difficult negotiations on Ukraine, on the Donbass.

- By the way, about Ukraine. What, in your opinion, is the fate of Don-bass?

The longer he stays outside Ukraine, the more difficult it will be to integrate him there, and the time limit, as it seems to me, is five years. After that, alienation and enmity can become difficult to overcome. As the Russian side says at the talks: if we weaken support for the Donbass, Ukrainian troops will enter there and mass repressions will begin. However, there is a certain compromise option: Donbass goes under temporary international administration (UN, for example) and the “blue helmets” enter there. Several years (at least five - seven) will be spent on the reconstruction of the region, the formation local authorities power and so on. Then a referendum is held on its status. Currently, Ukraine is vehemently rejecting the idea of ​​federalization because Russia is proposing it. And if Europe proposes federalization, then Ukraine can accept this idea.

- And no Zakharchenko?

He will go somewhere... If not to Argentina, then to Rostov.

- What do you think: in the summer of 2014, it was possible to go to Mariupol, Kharkov, then everywhere else?

In April 2014, this could have been done much easier, and no one could have defended themselves. One local high-ranking character, we will not name names (although we know), called Turchynov and said: if you resist, in two hours the troops will land on the roof of the Verkhovna Rada. He wouldn't have landed, of course, but it sounded so convincing! Turchynov tried to organize a defense, but only the police with pistols were at his disposal. And he himself was ready to climb onto the roof with a grenade launcher and in a helmet ...

- Why didn't you go? Afraid that SWIFT will be turned off?

I don't think it would be turned off. In my opinion, they would have swallowed it the same way they swallowed Crimea in the end: after all, we have the main sanctions for the Donbass. But, firstly, it turned out that in Kharkov and Dnepropetrovsk the mood is far from being the same as in Donetsk. And secondly, let's even say you have annexed Ukraine as a whole - and what to do? There are only two and a half million people in Crimea - and even then its integration into Russia is, frankly, not going smoothly. And here - about forty-five million! And what will you do with them when it is not clear how to deal with your own?

- Actually, there is another scenario. Kim Jong-un will bang - and all our problems will cease to exist.

Doesn't bang.

- But why? Did he launch a rocket over Japan?

He has few of these missiles. And he won't do anything with Guam. The only thing he really threatens is Seoul. But South Korea has the status of a strategic ally of the United States, and after the first strike on Seoul - and there really is nothing to be done there, the distance is 30-40 km to the border - Trump has a free hand and the Kim regime ceases to exist.

“So it’s all going to end there?”

I think under Trump, yes. My friends from Seoul...

- Sources too?

Colleagues. And they say that there is no premonition of war or even a military threat: the metropolis lives an ordinary life, people do not panic ...

- What, in your opinion, is Russia's real role in Trump's victory?

Russia (or, as Putin called it, "patriotic hackers") did launch attacks, after which Obama, he said, warned Putin, and the attacks stopped. But all this was before September 2016! Otherwise, Trump's victory is the result of his successful political strategy and Hillary's mistakes. She couldn't play on the predestination factor. If you talk all the time about your uncontested victory, they will want to teach you a lesson. This, by the way, is one of the reasons why Putin is slow to announce the campaign. What did Trump do? His team clearly understood which states to win. Trump has successfully politicized the rednecks, a white middle class that is embittered and somewhat stagnant. He showed them an alternative: you are not voting for an establishment man, but for a simple guy, the flesh of the flesh of authentic America. And he won on it. But Trump - and this was understood here - is not so good for Russia: rather, Moscow simply did not like Clinton very much.

- Is there a global revenge of conservatives in the world?

It was possible to believe in these myths in 1916, when Brexit happened at the same time, Trump won, and Le Pen got some chances. But Le Pen never had a chance to go beyond the second round. And then ... Relapses happen, without them the era does not go away, but as the era of Gutenberg ended, so did the time of political conservatism, as we knew it before. People live with other oppositions, other desires, and the fight against globalism is the destiny of those who want to live in the "mental Donbass". There will always be such people, these are their personal ideas, which do not affect anything.

- A big war is not visible on the Russian routes?

We certainly do not initiate it. If others start, which is extremely unlikely, they will have to participate, but Russia itself has neither the idea, nor the resource, nor the desire. What war, what are you talking about? Look around: how many volunteers went to Donbass? War is a great way to solve internal problems, as long as it does not lead to suicide: this is the situation now.

- But why did they take Crimea then? Distracted from the protests?

I don't think. The protests were not dangerous. Putin just wondered: what will remain of him in history? Olympics? And if he really raised Russia from its knees, what was the result of this? The idea of ​​appropriation/return of Crimea existed before the Maidan, just in a milder version. Let's buy it from you. It was possible to agree on this with Yanukovych, but then the power in Ukraine collapsed, and Crimea actually fell into hands.

- And will remain Russian?

I guess yes. It will be written in the Ukrainian Constitution that he is Ukrainian, but everyone will put up with it.

- But how do you imagine the idea that post-Putin Russia will live with?

Very simple: recovery. Because now the country and society are seriously ill, and we all feel it. The problem is not even corruption, this is a special case. The problem is in the deepest, triumphant, general immorality. In absolute absurdity, idiocy, which is felt at all levels. In the Middle Ages, where we fall - not by someone's evil will, but simply because if there is no movement forward, then the world is rolling back. We need a return to the norm: normal education, calm business, objective information. Everyone wants this, and, with a few exceptions, even those around Putin. And everyone will breathe a sigh of relief when the norm returns. When they stop inciting hatred, and main emotion there will be no more fear. And then money will quickly return to the country - including Russian money, withdrawn and hidden. And we will become one of the best launch pads for business, and economic growth within ten to twenty years may turn out to be record-breaking.

- And how will we all live together again - so to speak, our Crimean and Namkrysh?

Well, after civil war how did you live? You have no idea how quickly it all grows. People sort things out when they have nothing to do, and then everyone will have something to do, because today in the country there is total senselessness and aimlessness. This will end - and everyone will find something to do. Except, of course, those who want to remain irreconcilable. There are five percent of such people in any society, and this is their personal choice.

- Finally, explain: how are you tolerated at MGIMO?

You know from your own experience that there are different people at MGIMO. There are retrogrades and liberals, there are rightists and leftists. And I am neither the one nor the other. I look at everything from the standpoint of ordinary, unbiased common sense. And to everyone who wants to be a successful interpreter of reality here, I can give the only advice: do not look for cunning plans and malicious intent where banal stupidity, greed and cowardice operate.